

GELERTER ON HIMMELFARB


GERECHT ON BERNARD LEWIS

the weekly

Standard

JUNE 5, 2006

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POLYGAMY vs. DEMOCRACY

BY STANLEY KURTZ

MARIJUANA AND YOUR TEEN'S MENTAL HEALTH

Depression. Suicidal Thoughts. Schizophrenia.

If you have outdated perceptions about marijuana, you might be putting your teen at risk. New research is giving us better insight into the serious consequences of teen marijuana use, especially how it impacts mental health.

Did you know that young people who use marijuana weekly have double the risk of depression later in life?¹ And that teens aged 12 to 17 who smoke marijuana weekly are three times more likely than non-users to have suicidal thoughts?²

And if that's not bad enough, marijuana use in some teens has been linked to increased risk for schizophrenia in later years.³

Today's teens are smoking a more potent drug⁴ and starting use at increasingly younger ages during crucial brain development years.⁵ Still think marijuana's no big deal?

Remember, you are the most important influence in your teen's life when it comes to drugs⁶; so tell your teen the facts about marijuana. Teens who learn about the risks from their parents are less likely to smoke marijuana or use other drugs than teens who don't.

Let your teens know you don't want them using marijuana. Their mental health may depend on it.

Signed,

- American Psychiatric Association
- American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
- American Society of Addiction Medicine
- Asian Community Mental Health Services
- Association for Medical Education and Research in Substance Abuse
- Institute for Behavior and Health, Inc.
- National Asian American Pacific Islander Mental Health Association
- National Association of Addiction Treatment Providers
- National Council for Community Behavioral Healthcare
- National Latino Behavioral Health Association
- National Medical Association
- Office of National Drug Control Policy
- Partnership for a Drug-Free America

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¹Patton, GC et al. Cannabis use and mental health in young people: cohort study. *British Medical Journal*, 325: 1195-1198, 2002. ²Greenblatt, J. Adolescent self-reported behaviors and their association with marijuana use, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 1998. ³Arseneault, L et al. Cannabis use in adolescence and risk for adult psychosis: longitudinal prospective study. *British Medical Journal*, 325: 1212-1213, 2002; Veen, N et al. Cannabis use and age at onset of schizophrenia. *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, 161: 501-506, 2004. ⁴Marijuana Potency Monitoring Project. Report No. 83, University of Mississippi, 2003. ⁵SAMHSA. Trends in Initiation of Substance Use, 2003. ⁶SAMHSA. Parental Disapproval of Youths' Substance Abuse, 2002.

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In the new issue of *Policy Review*

The Shadow of the Bomb, 2006

Keeping nukes away from bad actors

[W]e have to ask: Is it possible for the United States and its friends to agree on criteria for diplomatic initiatives to head off other crises like the one we now face in North Korea and the one looming with Iran? And if the diplomatic initiatives fail in North Korea and Iran, and perhaps elsewhere in the future, will we be able to agree on criteria appropriate for imposing sanctions and, perhaps, eventually for initiating forceful actions against those who insist on moving ahead toward acquiring nuclear capabilities and are behaving aggressively? The experience at the United Nations leading up to the invasion of Iraq shows how difficult that challenge will be. A serious effort to come to such agreements will have to start by restoring and strengthening the international consensus against nuclear proliferation, and defining clear responsibilities and authority for action by the UN Security Council.

—*Sidney D. Drell*

Are Doctors Biased?

The factors underlying disparities in treatment

Ultimately, improvement in the quality of care and self-care would elevate the status of minority health appreciably. But the greater public-health good would be served by applying these goals to all underserved people rather than focusing on minorities. By focusing on those with the worst health, the targets of intervention will still turn out to be poor minority groups, but they will include lower-class whites as well. For example, establishing screening (for cancer, diabetes, or hypertension) or wellness-education programs in benighted areas such as southeast Washington, D.C., or the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles would benefit all residents and shrink overall racial differentials in health outcome because they would disproportionately target minorities.

—*Sally Satel and Jonathan Klick*

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HOOVER INSTITUTION

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Russia, Iran and Qatar have 58% of the world's natural gas reserves.

The U.S. has 3%.

So what does that mean for us?

As demand for power and fuel grows steadily in the coming decades, we must consider every viable energy source at hand if we're to meet the world's needs. And because clean natural gas is found in abundance there is little doubt that it will play a major role on the world energy stage in this century, much like oil did in the last. But, like oil, gas reserves are concentrated in just a few places in the world, usually far from where they're needed most. And that's only part of the challenge. The world has had well over 100 years to search for oil and to build the necessary infrastructure to bring it to market; the natural gas infrastructure, particularly when it comes to liquefied natural gas (LNG), is not nearly as developed.

So what needs to be done? On the supply side, producing nations need policies that allow for efficient development of their natural gas in an open, stable business environment, not one in which the rules of the game change without warning. The governments of consuming nations, on the other hand, must enact long-term policies to encourage such development and to ensure they'll have adequate supplies in the future. That means building the related infrastructure, including LNG terminals. This, in turn, will require coastal communities to allow these necessary, but not necessarily pretty, facilities to be built in their backyards. And energy companies have a responsibility to be good neighbors in those communities by operating these facilities responsibly and safely. They must also continue to invest the billions of dollars needed to build the complex transport and storage infrastructure required to bring more gas to market.

Expanding and diversifying energy sources by using more natural gas could lead to lower fuel prices and to greater energy security. We've taken some of the steps to get started, but we need your help to get the rest of the way.

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Chevron Steps Taken:

- Planning to invest more than \$10 billion in developing gas projects over the next five years.
- Developing one of the largest integrated LNG projects in the world.
- Created a four country partnership to build West Africa's first regional gas pipeline.
- Spending more than \$1 billion over the next several years on next generation, ultra clean diesel fuel from natural gas.



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Always Look on the Dark Side . . .

Pound for pound, there may be no more thrilling display of American military pageantry than the show put on several dozen times each year by the Navy's Blue Angels—the team of six F/A-18 Hornets that famously fly in a tight formation, with as little as 18 inches separating their wingtips, among other aerial feats.

Leave it to the *New York Times* to rain on the parade. Last week the Blue Angels decided to treat Manhattan's tower dwellers to a free show, as they practiced for an upcoming performance nearby. The *Times* pursed its lips in sour disapproval, running the following

caption in local editions, beneath an admittedly dazzling photo: "Too Close for Comfort? The Navy's Blue Angels precision flying team made a close-

quarters pass over the Upper East Side yesterday, a preview of their participation in the New York Air Show at Jones Beach on Sunday and Monday as part of Memorial Day observances. The sight of the fighters and their noise startled some residents, who recalled 9/11 in anxious phone calls."

A SCRAPBOOK informant and Blue Angels fan who saw the Upper East Side fly-by begged to differ. He said he'd heard from friends, Columbia students and bankers, who said people lined the windows of their buildings and thought it was "the greatest thing they ever saw." ♦



Dog Bites Man

Fair is fair: Not everything we read in the *New York Times* curls our hair. Indeed, last Wednesday's edition brought an article displaying originality of thought and—believe it or not—refreshingly devoid of any implication that President Bush and congressional Republicans are doing their best to wreck the United States of America. Of course, you could only find the article in the "Business" section, not the front page. (That would probably be asking too much.) Still, business columnist David Leonhardt's "This Glass Is Half Full, Probably More," contains many distinctly un-*Times*-like sentiments, such as this:

The fact is that by most broad measures—wages, average life span, crime, education levels, home ownership, and racial and gender equality, to name a few—life in this country has clearly improved over the last generation. And most Americans think about their lives in these terms. In polls, even low-income people generally say they are better off than their parents were, probably because most are.

Even more daring, Leonhardt goes out of his way to attack lefty icon Thomas Frank, whose *What's the Matter with Kansas?* spent 35 weeks on the *Times*'s bestseller list.

Frank's book makes the case that his fellow Kansans have succumbed to an angry "backlash" in which lower-

income voters elect politicians mouthing social conservatism but whose true agenda is all about enriching the upper crust. Suffice it to say, the book's something of a downer. Lucky for us, Leonhardt is around to set the record straight:

Close inspection uncovers a big problem with Mr. Frank's economic analysis. Wages haven't been falling in Kansas. Up and down the economic spectrum, they have been higher in the last few years than they were at any point in the 1980s or 90s, according to inflation-adjusted numbers from the Economic Policy Institute. The median Kansas worker made \$13.43 an hour in 2004, 11 percent more than in 1979, which



might help explain why many people don't vote on bread-and-butter issues anymore. . . .

More to the point, some other improvements have accelerated recently. In just the last 15 years, the murder rate has been cut almost in half. Many big cities are far more vibrant places than they used to be. About 33 percent of young adults get a bachelor's degree these days, up from 25 percent in the early 1990s. The gap between men's and women's pay reached its lowest ever last year. The divorce rate has stopped rising.

Many luxuries of earlier generations—owning a three-bedroom house,

flying across the country, calling relatives who live overseas—are staples of middle-class life. If all this doesn't add up to a rise in living standards, I'm not sure what the phrase means.

We couldn't have said it better ourselves. ♦

Viva Italia!

A few weeks back, Michael Goldfarb wrote about the Fran O'Brien's steakhouse ("Regular Guys," May 1), which had lost its lease. This was a blow not just for Washington, D.C., meat

lovers but, more important, for the wounded Iraq war vets at Walter Reed Army Medical Center who had been enjoying all-you-can-eat steak dinners with their families every Friday night at Fran's for the last two years.

Proprietor Marty O'Brien and partners are still searching for a site where they can reopen the restaurant. Meanwhile, the Italian ambassador has stepped into the breach for the veterans. *Stars and Stripes* reported last week that "Italian Ambassador Gianni Castellaneta and his wife, Lila, heard about Fran O'Brien's dinners through an Italian sponsor and offered to have the wounded service-members over to the embassy." According to Shoshana Bryen of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, which helps sponsor the dinners, the ambassador and his wife "have turned themselves inside out to be helpful."

On May 19, "the entire Italian diplomatic corps, including a cadre of military attachés, lined up to greet their guests as the buses ferrying the veterans and family members from the hospitals rumbled up" to the embassy. A gallery of photos from the event can be seen at stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=36450&archive=true ♦

A Show, a Show!

Illustrator Thomas Fluharty, who has created a number of unforgettable covers for *THE WEEKLY STANDARD* over the years, is exhibiting paintings, including several that first appeared in these pages, at the Neighborhood Church of Greenwich Village, 269 Bleecker Street, New York, N.Y. The show, "Naughty and Nice," runs from May 25 to June 17. The hours are 2-7 P.M., Mondays through Saturdays, and 3-6 P.M. on Sundays. Stop by and tell Tom how much you enjoy his work on Friday, June 16, at 7:30 P.M. ♦

Casual

COOPER DUPER NEWSMAN

When I was a college newbie, sitting at the scuffed Hush Puppies of my journalism professors, they tried to saddle me with their elbow-patched baggage of what a journalist should be: Ida Tarbell, Lincoln Steffens, Ernie Pyle—lightweights, all. The poor naïfs couldn't have known about the tectonic shift that was about to rupture the very continental crust of journalism. How the Gregorian calendar was about to be reset, so that now all journalistic history is divided into two periods: BAC and AAC. Before Anderson Cooper and After.

We now recognize the host of CNN's *360* the way we recognize the sun and moon, which are always before us, as Anderson is. He is silvery and sleek, the son of Gloria Vanderbilt, the friend of mankind. He is an enigma wrapped in a mystery ensconced in a French blue shirt, which really makes his eyes pop, by the way. Not that he cares about shirts. He doesn't really need one. In fact, if it were up to him, he'd probably do every show naked. Because that's how he comes to the story. And maybe because of that nakedness, he tells better stories. Which, strictly speaking, is a Nissan slogan. But I wouldn't be surprised if Nissan became one of his sponsors, since, they, like Anderson, understand narrative nudity.

Anderson goes where the news is, and even where it's not, sometimes bringing it with him in a carry-on bag, since he packs light, because he never knows when he's going to have to dodge a bullet or a hurricane projectile. Danger is his middle name. Actually "Hays" is, but "Danger" is so much more, I don't know, dangerous-sounding.

His first name is Anderson, which of course means "son of Andrew," as in the first disciple called by Jesus. And like our Lord and Savior, he is omnipresent. He's on two hours a night on America's News Leader, the second-place network CNN. He writes for *Details*, poses for *Maxim*, and is called one of the sexiest anchors alive by *Playgirl* magazine. There he is crying in New Orleans. Wait, no! Now his throat's tighten-



ing in Niger. Time out! Isn't that him vacationing in Rwanda at the genocide museum, since he says he hasn't been in a while? Hold up a second! What's that rustling? Is that Anderson under the bed, finding the news, emoting over it, smothering it with a pillow until its legs kick and twitch, then sliding out the bathroom window before anyone notices?

Oh, but we have noticed, Anderson. And not just me—Oprah! As in, Her Majesty, Oprah Winfrey! Like *60 Minutes*, she's now made Anderson a part-time correspondent on her show with other journalistic titans like Lisa Ling and the Big O's best friend, Gayle. Oprah's producers recently asked viewers to tell them how Anderson's reporting has inspired them. So I told them flat-out. I told them the truth, even though it

was a lie, because it was an emotional truth, which I think Anderson would understand.

I emailed how Anderson's reporting in Africa had inspired me to adopt from the Tembe National Park two baby elephants, which had been mistreated after they'd been sold to an abusive circus trainer. In my backyard, I'd imported Tembe-like vegetation to make Kimba and Malaaka feel at home. Then I used their droppings to fertilize my vegetable garden, the produce from which I donated to a nearby orphanage.

Oprah's producers never called. Apparently, too many others had been similarly inspired by Anderson. But, the point is, Anderson taught me, both as a reporter and a man. He taught me to see the truth, not with my eyes, but with my heart, even if my aortic valve needs glasses for reading, so that sometimes the truth looks a little blurry.

Now, there are more words of wisdom from Anderson in his new book, *Dispatches from the Edge*. I've been in journalism almost as long as Anderson and have datelined from places throughout the world. But never The Edge. I don't even know where it is. *Travelocity.com* doesn't sell flights there. I checked, just to make sure.

Wherever it is, he's been there, and when he gets there, there's a method to his madness: "I don't really drink, but I like the bar because there's no bulls— here." You gOprah, Anderson! I haven't been to The Edge, but I've been to bars, and I know that's the kind of talk that gets you respect in them. Or a punch in the face. Either way.

But if you want to punch him, you've got to catch him. And you can't catch him. Like a shark, he says, he has to move to breathe. So he'll settle his seltzer water tab, and be on his way, heading back to the front, forever following in disaster's wake: the Tsunami, Katrina, *NewsNight with Aaron Brown*.

MATT LABASH

Correspondence

NOT ALWAYS SO BLUNT

FRED BARNES's profile of Missouri governor Matt Blunt was intriguing, but Barnes makes a common error when he claims that Blunt supports a planned initiative to "allow stem cell research in Missouri" ("Taking a Blunt Approach," May 22). Actually, the initiative Blunt supports would create a right in Missouri's constitution to engage in human cloning for biomedical research (i.e., somatic cell nuclear transfer). SCNT is not a synonym for stem cell research, although proponents of human research cloning like Blunt pretend that it is, for political purposes. To state the matter accurately, Blunt supports creating human embryos asexually for destruction and use in stem cell research, which is why he has gotten in trouble with Missouri's pro-life community.

WESLEY J. SMITH
Castro Valley, Calif.

BLAIR'S IRISH BLARE

NOTABLY, Gerard Baker's "Tony Blair's Musical Chairs" (May 22) omits any mention of the issue that was reputed to have consumed much of Blair's time as prime minister: Northern Ireland. Could it be that another British PM has failed in this respect? That Blair has so little to show for such an investment of time speaks volumes.

THOMAS G. MITCHELL
Madison, Wisc.

THEY HAVE YOUR NUMBER

I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER two additional points to Heather Mac Donald's excellent "Information Please" (May 22). First, in 1979's *Smith v. Maryland*, the Supreme Court held that the warrant-

less disclosure to the government of dialed numbers already known to the phone company did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The author of that opinion was Justice Harry Blackmun, who—according to critics of the NSA program—should have known a thing or two about privacy.

Second, public relations matter. In the mid-1990s, associates of Colombian drug dealers were using shopping mall phone kiosks and telephone cards to make business calls. The DEA could not obtain



a warrant to listen because it could not identify exactly which phone would be used. I worked with the DEA and staff from both parties to draft a revision to the wiretapping laws to enable the DEA to follow a suspect on whatever phone he used. The prospects for the bill to become law were good until the FBI characterized the proposal as authorizing "roving wiretaps." (The revision ultimately became law in the Patriot Act.) This was not an isolated incident—remember the FBI's "Carnivore" Internet search protocol and the DOD "information market" to gauge terrorist

attacks supervised by former admiral John Poindexter? How a program is characterized matters greatly, especially in a soundbite age.

PAUL J. LARKIN JR.
Alexandria, Va.

IT IS AMUSING to note how docilely we submit to the IRS every possible bit of financial information that we have, while we descend into hysterics over "data mining" for purposes of national security.

RAMON V. MARTINEZ
Coral Gables, Fla.

REALLY TIME TO RALLY

REGARDING Jeffrey Bell and Frank Cannon's "Bush's Bad Polls" (May 8): If only we could hold on a national scale what we in the South refer to as a "come to Jesus meeting," with every single man, woman, and child, uniformed and civilian, urged to get involved somehow in the war effort. Either we fight with a unified dedication al Qaeda doesn't believe is possible or we pull up the stakes and come home. War is hell, and I believe we have spared the insurgents from hell for much too long (besides, the Iranians might take note).

RICHARD R. PIERCE JR.
Huntersville, N.C.

• • •

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
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Source: *Investment and Other Uses of Cash Flow by the Oil Industry*, Ernst & Young LLP, February 3, 2006

Oil and natural gas companies posted exceptionally strong financial results in 2005 and early 2006. While this obviously benefits the tens of millions of Americans who own shares in our companies, revenues on this scale make possible the massive investments necessary to ensure future energy

currently under serious consideration will boost domestic refining capacity by more than 1.3 million barrels per day by 2011, the equivalent of eight mid-sized refineries.

And because research and development drives new energy breakthroughs, oil and natural gas companies have

Investing to ensure our energy future

supplies. Steady, increasing industry investments since 1992 have exceeded total industry earnings, which have fluctuated from year to year.

Planned oil and natural gas capital expenditures this year in the U.S. alone total more than **\$124 billion** (a 21 percent increase from 2004), and between 1992 and 2005, the U.S. industry invested more than **\$1 trillion** in a range of long-term energy initiatives. Over this same period, we've invested **\$119 billion** to protect the environment. Investments either planned or

invested **\$98 billion** in emerging energy technologies since 2000 – 73 percent of the total **\$135 billion** spent by U.S. companies and the federal government combined.

These aren't short-term investments. They represent an ongoing, long-term commitment to ensure America's energy future for generations to come.

A Message From

America's Oil & Natural Gas Industry

To learn more, visit www.api.org

EDITORIAL

A Recuperating Duck

For a president who is (allegedly) the lamest of lame ducks, George W. Bush had a pretty good month of May. Not quite a merry month of May. Certainly not a Lerner-and-Loewe-like lusty month of May. But a pretty good month, and perhaps a sign of better things to come.

To wit:

Congress extended, and the president signed, the wildly successful supply-side tax cuts on interest and dividend income originally passed in 2003. The new tax rates are now in force until 2010, providing helpful certainty for the economy and the markets, and forcing Democrats in this year's congressional elections, and in the 2008 presidential election, either to accept a core element of Bush's economic policy, or to be for raising taxes.

Speaking of the economy . . . last week the Commerce Department revised first quarter growth up to 5.3 percent. Not too lame. Then we learned that new home sales had risen in April, suggesting a reasonably soft landing for the housing market. And gas prices even began to drift down. How much longer can people talk themselves into thinking the economy's in bad shape?

They can talk themselves into a frenzy about illegal immigration, of course. But on this issue, the Senate managed—contrary to the conventional wisdom of late April—easily to pass a sensible and comprehensive immigration reform bill. And House Republicans now show some signs of coming to realize that talk radio is not always the best source of policy guidance. Enough of them may come to realize that passing legislation they regard as flawed would be better than going home to the voters having achieved nothing. So Bush could have an immigration reform signing ceremony to look forward to in the fall.

Meanwhile, on the personnel front, new chief of staff Josh Bolten seems to have improved White House performance, and Tony Snow took over as press secretary to rave reviews. Michael Hayden was easily confirmed by the Senate as CIA director—as all the hoopla over warrantless wiretapping and data mining of phone records came to nothing. The imminent departure of John Snow as Treasury secretary—though Snow has actually done a creditable job—will allow for the announcement of a fresher face (perhaps Commerce secretary Carlos Gutierrez) sometime soon.

The administration also got a boost on the judicial

front, shepherding Brett Kavanaugh through to confirmation to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. If a Supreme Court seat comes open in a month, the administration seems prepared, with (sources say) a short list of well-vetted and well-qualified conservative candidates.

The silly flap over the FBI search, pursuant to a judicial warrant, of Rep. William Jefferson's office serves as a reminder that, for all the talk of the dire consequences of the Abramoff scandal for the GOP, congressional scandals are not limited to the Republican party. Indeed, Jefferson's refusal to yield to Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi's plea to quit his position on the Ways and Means committee suggests some disarray in Democratic ranks.

In the meantime, the May 15 deadline for signing up for the Medicare prescription drug benefit passed with some 90 percent of eligible seniors enrolled, and most of them telling pollsters they're pretty happy. Given early rumblings that the program might be a nightmare of red tape, this is good news for the administration.

What about the world, and the war? There is a new Iraqi government, and we saw an impressive display of resolution on the Iraqi front by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair at their press conference last Thursday night. The president seems to have resisted calls to draw down troops precipitately, correctly understanding that he will get no credit for losing Iraq with 100,000 troops rather than 135,000. The bad news is that there has been no apparent reconsideration of military strategy. There has been no attempt to take advantage of the existence of a new Iraqi government to launch a more aggressive counterinsurgency, with additional U.S. troops, in order to help put the Iraqi government and its army on a path to real progress and victory.

As for Iran, the State Department seems to remain in charge of U.S. policy, and unwilling to come to grips with the urgency and gravity of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's challenge. Iran and Iraq are very likely to define the historical judgment on the Bush presidency. So these foreign policy splotches on the picture of a rosy May painted above are important. But if the president realizes he really isn't a lame duck, and that he has two and a half years left—two and a half years in which his foreign policy can either succeed or fail—he can begin to turn his attention to reenergizing that foreign policy in June.

—William Kristol

With this Bill . . .

The Senate debates marriage.

BY FRED BARNES

JUNE 6, 2006, is an important date, not only because it's the 62nd anniversary of D-Day. It's also the day the Senate will vote on the so-called marriage amendment, which would amend the Constitution to restrict marriage in America to a man and a woman.

It won't pass. A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House. When the Senate voted in 2004, the amendment got only 48 votes. This time, it's likely to get more—probably between 52 and 58—in part because a powerful and unusually ecumenical religious coalition is now backing the amendment. And President Bush, despite his wife Laura's admonition that the marriage issue ought to be kept out of politics, plans to host a pro-amendment event at the White House and speak out in favor of the amendment.

Once dismissed as a sop to social conservatives, the proposed amendment has become a serious rallying point for opponents of same-sex marriage. The June 6 vote will put senators on the record and make their position on the amendment a potential campaign issue. And the formation of the religious coalition means the issue won't go away soon.

Much of the conventional wisdom about the amendment and the marriage issue turns out to be wrong. For instance, the amendment is not being pushed by Republicans as a wedge issue aimed at dividing Democratic voters. Republican senators regard the issue as touchy and awkward. In fact, they agree with First Lady Laura Bush, who said on *Fox News Sunday*

that the subject of gay marriage "requires a lot of sensitivity" and shouldn't "be used as a campaign tool." They'd prefer the issue—and the amendment—go away.

When Majority Leader Bill Frist asked Senate Republican committee chairmen in 2004 if they wanted him to schedule a vote on the amendment, none urged him to. Frist did anyway. This year, the same was true. He received no pressure from Republican senators for a vote. Instead, his talks with Tony Perkins of the Family

The conventional wisdom—that the marriage amendment won't have a significant role in the race for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination—is wrong.

Research Council led Frist to put at least a day of debate on the amendment, then a vote, on the Senate schedule.

The hands-off attitude of Republican senators, Perkins says, "does not reflect what's happening in the states." Whenever a referendum barring same-sex marriage gets on the ballot, it's nearly always approved by 70 percent or more of voters, he noted.

A second misconception is that it's sufficient for an elected official merely to declare his opposition to gay marriage. It's not anymore. The question now is whether an official will support efforts to block gay marriage from being imposed by judges at the federal or state level. And the way to

do that in the Senate is to vote for the amendment.

The conventional wisdom in the political community is also wrong on another point: that the marriage amendment won't have a significant role in the race for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination. It will. A Gallup poll found two-thirds of Republicans back the amendment. Perkins, for one, insists the marriage issue has "reached the same plane as the right to life issue" among Republican voters. "I don't think you can win the presidential nomination without endorsing the marriage amendment," Perkins says.

This is a huge problem for Senator John McCain, the Republican front-runner in 2008. McCain has moved to the right on taxes and abortion and recently reconciled with Jerry Falwell, the prominent conservative Christian. He drew sharp criticism for the Falwell overture and is leery of shifting again and being accused of pandering to the Christian Right.

McCain voted against the amendment in 2004. And he repeated his opposition on *Fox News Sunday* last month. "I will vote against it because I believe very strongly, first of all, in the sanctity of union between man and woman, but I also believe that the states should make these decisions." Many religious conservatives regard this as an unacceptable dodge.

Why? Because states have already been thwarted in their efforts to make these decisions. The problem is not voters or legislators. They overwhelmingly support traditional marriage. Thirty-seven states have enacted laws in recent years—19 by referendum, the others by statute—to bar gay marriage. The problem is judges. On May 16, a Georgia judge struck down the state's ban on gay marriage, which had been enacted in 2004 with 76 percent of the vote. The judge seized on a technical point, ruling the referendum covered two issues, same-sex marriage and civil unions, and not one, as Georgia law required. In truth, the referendum was drafted to deal with one issue, the protection of heterosexual marriage. At least nine states face law-

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suits challenging their traditional marriage laws.

In Nebraska as well, a federal judge on May 12 nullified a referendum barring gay marriage. And in Massachusetts, the state supreme court by a 4-3 vote imposed same sex marriage, basing its decision on a state constitution adopted centuries before gay marriage became an issue.

In response, the Religious Coalition for Marriage was formed specifically to back the amendment. It grew out of two conferences of religious leaders and academics organized by Professor Robert George of Princeton. George and others found politicians, even conservative ones, are “afraid” to oppose gay marriage by backing the amendment: “They don’t like to talk about it.” The coalition was created to put strong public pressure on both politicians and judges.

The coalition’s initial statement said: “We take the unprecedented stand of uniting to call for a constitutional amendment to establish a uniform national definition of marriage as the exclusive union of one man and one woman. . . . This is the only measure that will adequately protect marriage from those who would circumvent the legislative process and force a redefinition of it on the whole of our society.”

What’s surprising about the coalition is its breadth. It includes all eight Catholic cardinals in America, liberal and conservative, plus officials of the Southern Baptist Convention, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, the Church of God in Christ, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons), among others.

As for Bush, he will appear on June 5 in the Rose Garden before a gathering of amendment supporters and, a White House official says, “strongly support” the amendment. The president has rarely mentioned the amendment in the past. The choice of the Rose Garden as a venue means he is raising the marriage amendment to a higher level on his agenda, his wife’s advice notwithstanding. ♦

As Sensenbrenner Goes

So goes immigration legislation.

BY MATTHEW CONTINETTI

“I’M HOPEFUL that the House will save us from this bill,” Sen. John Ensign, Republican of Nevada, told reporters last week, moments before his colleagues passed, 62 to 36, the most significant revision of U.S. immigration law in more than two decades. (Ensign voted no.)

That revision includes an additional 350 miles of fencing on the border, an annual increase, through 2011, in the number of Border Patrol agents, financial penalties for businesses that employ illegal migrants, a dizzyingly complex “employer verification system” to check the legal status of new hires, and an annual inflow of 200,000 guest-workers who could eventually apply for naturalization.

Finally—and most controversially—the Senate bill would create a three-tiered system of regulation that would allow undocumented workers who have been in the United States for more than five years to apply for naturalization without leaving the country, permit those who have been here between two and five years to apply once they return to their country of origin, and order those who have been here for less than two years to return home, period.

And here things get tricky. In December, the House of Representatives passed its own landmark immigration legislation, which lacks the guest-worker provision and contains no avenue for the illegal migrants already in the United States to move toward naturalization. Instead, the House bill, among other things,

authorizes 700 miles of border fencing, penalizes those who help illegal migrants remain in the United States, and says that being in the country illegally is a federal crime. The implication is that the presence of millions of illegal laborers in the United States is simply a law-enforcement problem.

The House bill passed, with overwhelming Republican support, 239 to 182. The Senate bill split the Republican caucus and relied on Democratic votes for passage. Only four Democrats—Robert Byrd, Byron Dorgan, Ben Nelson, and Debbie Stabenow—voted no. Only 23 of 55 Republicans voted yes. President Bush—whose stated views are closer to the Senate’s than the House’s—the Republican party, and the conservative movement are at an impasse.

What next? House and Senate leaders will each appoint a set of conferees who will, over the next several months, attempt to work out a compromise satisfactory to both chambers. If that works, Bush will be able to claim victory on one of his top domestic priorities. The hurdles that such a compromise will have to surmount, however, are formidable.

The first hurdle to any compromise is James Sensenbrenner, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, who will head the House negotiating team, and who brings to the task certain unique talents. Sensenbrenner, who has represented Wisconsin’s Fifth District since 1979, last stepped into public view this past winter, when he, along with Senate Judiciary chairman Arlen Specter, shepherded the Patriot Act to reauthorization over the objections of several senators.

Sensenbrenner’s colleagues typi-

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cally use a single word to describe him. "He's tough," Rep. Tom Davis of Virginia told reporters at a breakfast last week. "He really takes an unusual delight in these conferences," Rep. Peter King of New York said of Sensenbrenner. "He relishes that type of combat." Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, whose district borders Sensenbrenner's, told me, "He's a tough guy to reckon with, a tough negotiator, and he's taking a tougher stance as this thing progresses."

Though moderate on some issues, Sensenbrenner, who declined an interview for this article, has moved steadily to the right on immigration. The Senate's advocates have no reason to be encouraged by his recent public statements. On May 21, in an appearance on CBS's *Face the Nation*, he said that, contrary to the denials of President Bush, the Senate's approach "unfortunately is amnesty, because it gives a lawbreaker a way to become a citizen by paying a \$2,000 fine. We shouldn't be selling American citizenship."

Sensenbrenner added, however, "I don't think anything is a deal-breaker, but one of the things we've got to do is prevent the country from repeating the failed 1986 Simpson-Mazzoli law." Later, he said: "I am afraid that the Senate is going down the same road of the mistake that was made 20 years ago." Later still, he said, "I can just see 1986 repeating itself." On May 26, Sensenbrenner said the Senate bill was a "non-starter."

The next hurdle is Sensenbrenner's colleagues. Few House Republicans support the centerpiece of the Senate approach—the attempt to regularize the status of the more than 11 million undocumented workers already in the United States. Any way you slice it, they say, it amounts to amnesty. Last week, in an appearance at the Heritage Foundation, Rep. Mike Pence of Indiana, a leader among House conservatives, was asked about the Senate bill. "There's virtually no support back home or in my heart for amnesty," he said.

"I am very confident that right

now a solid majority of House Republicans would oppose the Senate bill," Rep. King said. "A solid majority want border security first." Rep. Roy Blunt of Missouri, the majority whip, told me, "In the eyes of many Americans, the view is, before you can solve the other problems, you really have to demonstrate that the border is secure."

Blunt expressed interest in Sen. Johnny Isakson's proposed amendment to the Senate bill, which would have required that the Department of Homeland Security certify that the border is secure before a guest-worker or earned-legalization program could begin. But Democrats, and the Republican leadership in the Senate, saw the amendment as a poison pill that would guarantee the death of any reform package, and defeated it 40 to 55.

Immigration "is the hottest issue out there," Davis said. "Everybody is talking about this thing. I've seen it in my own district—and these are not knee-jerk people." Davis added that Rep. Chris Shays of Connecticut, one of the most liberal House Republicans, comes back from his district each week saying the same thing. "For those of us on the hustings, talking to people," Davis went on, "people are much closer to the House side" of the immigration debate.

But, like New England weather, political dynamics can be turbulent. They can change quickly. The immigration issue is no exception. X-factors abound. The House bill sparked massive protests throughout the country, which encouraged the Senate and President Bush to act. But the spectacle of illegal immigrants filling the streets only hardened the position of the House GOP. Another mass mobilization, from either side of the debate, could have the same effect. "I think the demonstrations have had the opposite effect than the organizers intended," Blunt said. Paul Ryan agrees: "I think the protests and ensuing backlash have made it less likely to get a compromise bill."

A second variable is the pressure Republicans feel to act like a respon-

sible majority party. A party that finds itself unable to pass high-profile legislation will be seen as demonstrating an inability to govern, this thinking goes, and will pay for it at the polls. It was this sort of argument that contributed mightily to the House's passage of the Medicare prescription drug entitlement in November 2003. "We are perceived as running things," Davis told me. "This will be perceived as a test for voters. We've got to get something."

Says Blunt: "People send us here to do hard work. . . . I think the people we work for expect us to make every effort to solve this problem." A success on immigration reform could be the start to a Republican turnaround. And yet: "It's more important to do the right thing," Blunt added, "than it is to do something."

As the House and Senate go to conference, perhaps the largest unknown is how much clout President Bush is capable of wielding in the Senate bill's behalf. On May 15, in a televised address to the nation calling for "comprehensive reform," Bush made immigration a test of his embattled presidency. Twice in the past two weeks, he has dispatched his chief political adviser, Karl Rove, to Capitol Hill to woo recalcitrant congressmen. In addition to Rove, last week the president's chief of staff, Josh Bolten, visited Congress. Recently, Bush invited the House leadership to the Oval Office to discuss immigration.

"I've always said that the president's real legislative muscle is in the conference. I don't have any reason to believe that that's not true in this case as well," Blunt said. "I think the White House is hearing a very clear message from the House that the House members are fundamentally committed to securing the border."

Last week, I asked one GOP House member whether the president still has the political capital to shape the upcoming negotiations and win a legislative victory. "I don't know," he said. John Ensign may get his wish after all. ♦

The Natives Are Restless

Racial politics, Hawaii style.

BY DUNCAN CURRIE

BESIDES BOASTING one of the great names in American history, Hawaii's Queen Liliuokalani holds a unique distinction. She is the only foreign monarch to have been deposed with the apparent help of U.S. armed forces and then asked to resume her throne by a compunctious U.S. president (Grover Cleveland). Alas, things didn't pan out for Liliuokalani, who eventually abdicated. Her overthrow in 1893 paved the way for U.S. annexation of Hawaii five years later. To mark the 100th anniversary in 1993, Congress passed and President Clinton signed a resolution apologizing to the indigenous people of the Aloha State.

The Apology Resolution vastly overstated U.S. culpability in somewhat murky events, whose interpretation was distorted by politics both at the time and since. As a result—and because of the balkanizing implications of the resolution—some 34 senators, mostly Republicans, voted against the measure, including Arizona's John McCain and former Washington senator Slade Gorton.

"The resolution accomplishes one goal," Gorton argued. "It divides the citizens of the state of Hawaii—who are of course citizens of the United States—into two distinct groups: Native Hawaiians and all other citizens." According to Gorton—and despite the disavowals of the bill's Senate cosponsors, Hawaii Democrats Daniel Inouye and Daniel Akaka—"the logical consequence of this resolution would be independence."

He was prescient. Thirteen years

later, Congress is mulling the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, which would accord "Native Hawaiians" the same legal sovereignty as American Indians and Alaska Natives and allow them to create their own race-based governing structure. Would this lead to Native Hawaiian independence?

"That could be," Akaka told National Public Radio last summer. "I'm leaving it up to my grandchildren and great-grandchildren." Akaka, whose office drafted the Senate bill, has been pushing for Native Hawaiian "self-government and self-determination" since at least the Clinton administration.

Building on the Apology's reference to the "inherent sovereignty" of the Native Hawaiian people, Akaka's current legislation would grant membership in a new Native Hawaiian "tribe" to anyone who can trace their ancestry to "the aboriginal, indigenous, native people" living in Hawaii "on or before January 1, 1893." You also qualify if your ancestors were eligible in 1921 for largesse from the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, which stipulated at least one-half Native Hawaiian blood. (The Akaka bill itself requires no specific blood quantum.) More than 20 percent of Hawaii's 1.2 million citizens identify themselves as either wholly or partly Native Hawaiian, which would mean they are descended from the Polynesians who settled the islands a thousand years ago. Some 400,000 such Native Hawaiians are scattered throughout Hawaii and the rest of the United States.

The Akaka bill falsely assumes that Hawaii's pre-1893 political system was

racially homogenous. In fact, a flood of Caucasian, Japanese, and Chinese immigration to the islands began in the mid-19th century, thanks to the growth of sugar and pineapple plantations. The monarchical governments were multiracial, as was Hawaiian society.

Indeed, Hawaii has long billed itself as a paragon of ethnic harmony and racial fusion. Former Hawaii governor Jack Burns, first elected in 1962, "was fond of saying that the easy relations between men of various races in Hawaii represented the best hope of mankind," writes historian Gavan Daws. Rates of intermarriage today are high—more than ten times the national average, according to one Census estimate—further diluting any "Native Hawaiian" purity. The state's most famous political figures include Hawaiian-Chinese and Hawaiian-Japanese. Hawaii's current governor is Jewish.

Some 94 percent of Hawaiians voted for statehood in a 1959 plebiscite. But the past decade has witnessed a flare-up of separatist, and often anti-American, passions, marked by street demonstrations in 1998 (the centennial of U.S. annexation) and in August 2005, after the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the racial-preference policy at a well-known Native Hawaiian private school was unconstitutional. (The court has since agreed to reconsider its decision.) Many of Hawaii's more radical independence advocates have zinged the Akaka bill for being wimpy: It accepts the "continued foreign domination" of Hawaii by the U.S. government, one activist told the *New York Times* last summer. These folks want outright secession.

Which brings us to the question: What precisely would a Native Hawaiian governing council do, and what benefits would its members enjoy?

Pro-sovereignty forces insist they have no desire to build tribal casinos, as Indians have done. But opponents expect a flurry of litigation over property claims. The Native Hawaiian government would negotiate directly with state and federal officials. It

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would conceivably be exempt, as Indian tribes are, from portions of the Bill of Rights and from the Fourteenth Amendment. In effect, Native Hawaiians would be subject to a different legal code than other Americans.

Here's where geography could really muddy the waters. Besides not being a distinct political community, Native Hawaiians are not concentrated in one place; they live all across Hawaii, and all across the United States. For that matter, many reside abroad. "Somebody with Hawaiian ancestry living in Frankfurt, Germany, could be a member of this new Hawaiian nation," says Dick Rowland, president of Hawaii's Grassroot Institute, which opposes the Akaka bill. "Now, I have no idea what the hell that means."

It could mean nonstop racial litigation. Small wonder that, in mid-May, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report urging Congress to reject Akaka's bill—and to reject "any

other legislation that would discriminate on the basis of race or national origin and further subdivide the American people into discrete subgroups accorded varying degrees of privilege." A few Senate Republicans have vigorously opposed the legislation—including Arizona's Jon Kyl, Tennessee's Lamar Alexander, Kentucky's Mitch McConnell, Oklahoma's Tom Coburn, and Alabama's Jeff Sessions.

"What this bill does is deny equal protection," Alexander told me. "We're gradually eroding what it means to be an American." He disputes the analogy with Indian tribes. "We've never recognized a new Indian tribe, only existing tribes." He notes that Mexican separatists might use the Akaka bill as a pretext for demanding their own sovereign nation in the American Southwest.

The critics get succor from a 2000 Supreme Court decision, *Rice v. Cayetano*, which focused on the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), an entity

created by the state in 1978 chiefly to promote the welfare of indigenous Hawaiians. Voting rights in OHA trustee elections were restricted to Native Hawaiians who satisfied a racial blood quota. The Court ruled this violated the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal voting rights for all citizens. A concurring opinion, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Souter, looked askance at the broad definition of Native Hawaiian tribal status embraced by the OHA.

It was in response to *Rice* that Akaka first introduced a Native Hawaiian sovereignty bill in July 2000. The House passed similar legislation a few months later. Ever since, Akaka has been trying to get his measure to the Senate floor, with no luck. But GOP Senate leader Bill Frist promised him a much-belated cloture vote the week of June 5, when Congress returns from recess. Odds are it will pass. The Patton Boggs law firm, a titan of K Street lobbying, is pushing the legislation full throttle. Democratic support appears to be near universal. And Republican resistance has been meager.

It's hardly surprising that Alaska's two GOP senators, Ted Stevens and Lisa Murkowski, are cosponsoring the Akaka bill; the Alaska and Hawaii delegations have famously close ties. What is surprising is to see such Republican cosponsors as South Carolina's Lindsey Graham, Minnesota's Norm Coleman, and Oregon's Gordon Smith. Perhaps they simply followed the lead of Hawaii governor Linda Lingle, the first Republican elected governor since 1962. Lingle, who campaigned on the issue of native sovereignty in 2002 and is a friend of the Bush White House, has told the *New York Times* there are at least 6 GOP senators who are prepared to vote with the entire 45-member Democratic caucus in favor of Akaka's bill. "I feel that we have the votes," Akaka told me.

Which means, barring a presidential veto, Native Hawaiian sovereignty may soon be a reality. Get ready for the lawsuits, if not the casinos. ♦

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Meatheadgate

Rob Reiner's sagging political fortunes.

BY BILL WHALEN

YOU CAN NEVER be too rich or too thin, the saying goes, and it certainly holds true for California's June 6 primary. State Controller Steve Westly, a former eBay executive and Democratic candidate for governor, has spent \$34.5 million of his own fortune in hopes of earning the right to face Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger this fall. The other Democrat in the race, State Treasurer Phil Angelides, would certainly be out of the running by now but for a wealthy friend who spent \$6 million on an "independent" expenditure to prop up his flagging campaign. As for the Governorator, he's not exactly living on K rations: According to the *Los Angeles Times*, Team Arnold has spent nearly \$145 million (including \$25 million of Schwarzenegger's own money) on various campaigns over the past five years.

Meanwhile, only two initiatives will be on the ballot—an anorexic figure by California standards—and one of them now lacks its main champion. That would be Rob Reiner, the movie director and left-wing activist who is responsible for Prop. 82, which would guarantee preschool for every California 4-year-old by raising taxes on the state's top income-earners (\$400,000 for individuals; \$800,000 for couples). Reiner's sudden exit from the debate and the possible defeat of Prop. 82 may augur the return of a California politics that is less starstruck and less sentimental. One can hope so, at any rate.

While there's no denying the emotional tug of preschool, much about Prop. 82 defies common sense. According to various analyses of the measure, the \$2.4 billion tax increase would result in only an additional 4 percent of

preschoolers being enrolled. Under Reiner's rules, three hours of preschool, three times a week, would cost \$8,000 per child, with only 8.4 percent of the new program's funding going to high-risk children. Because the initiative requires preschool teachers to obtain a bachelor's degree, Reiner himself couldn't work in a preschool, as he attended but never graduated from UCLA.

Nor is Reiner's initiative a new approach to California policymaking. In the Golden State, the predictable liberal bromide is higher taxes for expanded government, one example being Proposition 63, approved in November 2004, which raised taxes on millionaires to expand state mental-health programs. While Reiner wants higher taxes for universal preschool, gubernatorial candidate Angelides wants to soak the rich to increase K-12 education spending. Even special interests play this game: The California Nurses Association, which fought Schwarzenegger tooth and nail in last fall's special election, has planned a November ballot initiative that would publicly finance state elections by increasing California's corporate tax.

Last November, Reiner was front and center in kicking off his initiative. The speculation then: Prop. 82 was a prequel to a run for governor, just as Schwarzenegger successfully campaigned for an after-school initiative a year before California's recall election. Reiner had momentum, as well as a fawning media. As recently as early March, *Washington Post* columnist E.J. Dionne extolled Reiner as "like Reagan, the opposite of a political dilettante." Today, a better description would be "albatross." With the primary days away, Reiner is nowhere to be seen—not on the campaign trail, nor in TV ads. If Prop. 82 fails—and the latest

polls have it barely above 50 percent—it will signal an end to Reiner's future as a candidate.

So what brought about this sudden reversal of political fortune? Credit it to dubious judgment and celebrity arrogance. In November 1998, Reiner spearheaded the passage of California's Proposition 10, which imposed a 50-cents-a-pack tax on cigarettes. It also created a state government "First Five" commission, chaired by Reiner, to spend the proceeds on public-awareness campaigns for early childhood development issues. Since then, First Five has spent some \$230 million on advertising and public relations, with Reiner's friends and Democratic cronies being the chief beneficiaries. That would include the Washington, D.C.-based GMMB agency, which also happens to be Reiner's political media consulting firm, as well as Los Angeles-based Rogers & Associates. The head of that firm, Ron Rogers, is the son of Henry Rogers, once described as the "father of Hollywood PR" and a friend of Carl Reiner, Rob Reiner's father.

The younger Reiner's mistake in allowing this "all in the family" approach to rewarding friends with taxpayer funds was compounded by his commission's use of those funds to advance the chairman's political agenda. While Reiner and his political team gathered signatures for Prop. 82 under the banner of "Preschool for All," First Five launched an advertising campaign to whet the public's appetite for preschool. That campaign's slogan was, oddly enough, "Preschool for All."

Thus began Reiner's second major mistake—a refusal to admit that his commission had overstepped its bounds. A mid-March appearance at the Sacramento Press Club meant to charm the political press corps and defuse the controversy instead backfired. Reiner was defensive and testy, didn't answer reporters' questions, and pleaded ignorance to the coordination of state resources and his own political ambition.

"He was either remarkably inattentive," surmises Bill Bradley, a Democratic insider whose *New West Notes*

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blog has been highly critical of Reiner, “or he was well aware of what was going on. He controlled the commission, so it is hard to believe the former. He thought it was okay to use taxpayer funds to stimulate demand for more government spending. It’s not.”

Reiner’s problems soon compounded when it was revealed that his term as First Five chairman had long expired—and Schwarzenegger was free to name a replacement. However, the Republican governor refused to name a successor, which led to still another flap: Was Arnold dallying because of his longtime friendship with Reiner or because of first lady Maria Shriver’s insistence that he be nice to Democrats? Or did the governor, who opposes Prop. 82, see an advantage in letting Reiner twist in the wind?

If it was the latter, then Reiner didn’t twist for long. Two weeks after failing to stem the tide at the Sacramento press conference, he sent a resignation letter to Schwarzenegger. “When you and I spoke over the weekend,” Reiner wrote, “we agreed that we cannot let personal political attacks get in the way of doing the very best we can for California’s children.” Twice, in his one-paragraph resignation, Reiner mentioned that his service was “voluntary.” Not once did he express contrition.

“Reiner’s fall can be traced to a negative celebrity two-step—viewed as going from selfless to selfish,” says Jonathan Wilcox, who teaches celebrity, culture, and public relations at USC’s Annenberg School for Communications. “In this, he became controversial—the one thing public figures who do good works can’t endure.”

A Reiner departure from the political stage, coupled with actor Warren Beatty’s decision to stay on the sidelines, may signal an end to California’s latest experiment with celebrity politics. A term-limited Schwarzenegger can’t run for reelection in 2010. And, assuming that Reiner is too tarnished and Beatty simply too old (he’ll be 73 in 2010), the rising stars on the Democratic side are likely to be actual politicians: Los Angeles mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and San Francisco’s charismatic mayor, Gavin Newsom.

Or perhaps California Democrats have already figured this out. “Reiner is Hollywood, not Sacramento, and the smart Democratic political consultants in this state—and there are a number of them—probably understood that

long before the party regulars,” claims Susan Rasky, a senior lecturer at Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism. In other words, the show must go on—with or without Reiner or any Hollywood Democrats on the playbill. ♦

Nuclear Proliferation

An industry rises from the dead.

BY WILLIAM TUCKER

“NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Tower Imploded,” blared a headline on *CNN.com*

last week, sounding overtones of another Three Mile Island. In fact, the cooling tower on the Trojan reactor north of Portland, Ore., abandoned 13 years ago, was being brought down by a demolition crew. Oh well, false alarm. As the press was out hunting the next nuclear accident, however, the real news was coming out of San Francisco, where the nuclear energy industry was celebrating its looming revival.

“We expect proposals for as many as 20 new reactors from 12 companies may be before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within the next two years,” said Frank “Skip” Bowman, president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, opening the group’s annual conference. “These will be the first efforts at new construction since 1974.”

Although it may be a decade before these plants come online, the buzz is that a new day is here. “Once we get the first plants through the regulatory process, the dam will break,” said Tony Earley, CEO of DTE Energy in Detroit. “There’s going to be a flood of new applications.”

Nuclear’s remarkable comeback has flown beneath the radar of the major media. Eight years ago, the industry was given up for dead. Operating costs

were skyrocketing, unplanned outages plagued the industry, and capacity (the percentage of time a plant is up and running) hovered around 65 percent. Under utility deregulation, nuclear plants had become “stranded investments”—huge white elephants that would make it difficult if not impossible for their owners to compete in an unregulated market. The Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration predicted nuclear’s share of electrical generation would decline from 18 percent to 7 percent by 2020. In 1998, the Department of Energy started phasing out nuclear research for the first time since World War II.

“I went into nuclear waste engineering because I heard they were going to be closing down plants, and I figured there would be jobs in decommissioning,” says Lisa Shell, who graduated from MIT with a master’s in 1997. Today Shell heads North American Young Generation in Nuclear, a thriving organization of young professionals who “believe the industry is alive and kicking.” Opportunity is rife, since half the aging workforce will be retiring in the next decade. “We’re thrilled there’s going to be new construction,” she says.

If there was a single turning point, it probably came in 1991, when Don Hintz, CEO of Entergy Nuclear in New Orleans, dispatched his vice president, Jerry Yelverton, to Russellville,

William Tucker is working on a book about the revival of nuclear power.

Ark., to take charge of Arkansas Units 1 and 2. These had just been designated the second- and tenth-worst-run reactors in the country by Ralph Nader's "Nuclear Lemons" award. "My assignment was either to shut the plants down or sell them," says Yelverton. Instead, he became obsessed with the idea of making nuclear reactors fulfill their promise.

"Most of the utility industry was treating nuclear as an extension of the fossil fuel industry," says Yelverton. "With coal, you run the plant until something breaks down, then you shut it down and fix it. You have to give the boiler a rest anyway, so it doesn't matter. That philosophy had carried over to nuclear. In the Navy, however, they run reactors for more than a year without shutting down. I decided to bring that kind of discipline to the commercial industry."

Concentrating on upgrading equipment, Yelverton soon had the capacity factor at the Arkansas plants rising toward 90 percent, an unheard-of figure. "We found most of the problems had very little to do with the nuclear side," says Gary Taylor, who replaced Yelverton as CEO of Entergy Nuclear in 2003. "It was things on the electric side—turbines and transmission—that were always breaking down. With coal it didn't matter that much. Now we realized nuclear could be held to a much higher standard."

Aware of Yelverton's success, Oliver Kingsley, a former Navy commander, took over nuclear operations at Chicago's Commonwealth Edison in 1997. He found six of the company's twelve reactors shut down while the others were producing at 47 percent. "I told people, if you want to play for Coach Kingsley, you'll have to measure up to new standards," says Kingsley. Within four years, he had all 12 reactors operating at close to 90 percent. In 2000, Commonwealth Edison spun out Exelon, which now owns 17 reactors, the nation's largest fleet.

To everyone's great surprise, upgrading capacity factor *improved* safety. The number of "scrams" and unplanned outages has fallen by more than 90 percent across the industry

during the past decade. "Performance and safety go hand-in-hand," says Kingsley, who now heads the World Association of Nuclear Operators. By 2004, the *entire industry's* capacity factor exceeded 90 percent. Nuclear now provides a larger share of the nation's electricity than it did in 1990, even though no new facilities have been built. "The improved performance has been the equivalent of adding 20 new reactors," says Marv Fertel, vice president of the Nuclear Energy Institute.

For their owners, nuclear plants have become a gold mine. In March, Connecticut attorney general Richard Blumenthal paid the ultimate tribute by proposing a windfall profits tax on the state's two reactors. "In 2006, the nuclear Millstone II and III generators in Waterford will have profits of \$274 million and \$419 million respectively," complained Blumenthal. More than half the nation's 103 reactors have now received 20-year extensions on their original licenses. Completely insulated from fossil fuel prices, they face a long, profitable future.

Still, there was little talk of new construction until another turning point—passage of the Energy Act of 2005, which offers a wide range of federal support. The bill provides loan guarantees, insurance against regulatory delays, plus a 1.8 cent-per-kilowatt-hour production tax credit to the first 6,000 megawatts of new capacity that make it through Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, licensing. "I don't think anybody seriously believed we were going to try new construction until those incentives were in place," says Entergy's Taylor. Now utilities and merchant companies—most of them in the South—are filing preliminary applications with the NRC almost every month. The commission is hiring 350 new staff members to handle the deluge.

"With operating costs now at about 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour, that tax credit is going to create huge profits," says Tim Valentine, head of nuclear research at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. "It's going to be a horse race to see who can get through NRC licensing first."

Environmentalists are slowly coming around. Patrick Moore, the cofounder of Greenpeace in 1972, has joined Christie Todd Whitman to form the Coalition for Safe Energy, an organization dedicated to promoting nuclear energy as a solution to global warming. "My friends say I'm trading on my past work at Greenpeace," said Moore after addressing the convention last week. "I tell them Greenpeace is trading on my past work."

Stewart Brand, the environmentalist founder of the *Whole Earth Catalogue*, has also joined the call for a revival. "It's not that I've seen the light," Brand told the NEI convention. "I've seen the dark." Brand warned that abrupt climate change could trigger mass starvation and universal warfare. "Don't try to sell my fellow environmentalists on this issue," he added. "They will have to sell themselves."

Problems remain. A spent fuel repository at Yucca Mountain is still a decade away—if it ever gets built at all. But other solutions are emerging. Dry cask storage, which could resolve the problem for decades, has already been adopted by several utilities. A return to fuel recycling—which was abruptly terminated by Jimmy Carter in 1977—would eliminate 95 percent of this supposed "waste" and make Yucca Mountain an afterthought.

In any case, the growing momentum within the industry is creating the sense that obstacles are no longer insurmountable. "The Tennessee Valley Authority's reconstruction of Brown's Ferry I is rolling along on time and on budget," says Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, a strong supporter of nuclear. Operating on a license issued in 1973, Brown's Ferry I—which closed in 1985—will be the first unit completed in more than a decade when it opens in 2007.

With France now producing 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear—and selling another \$55 billion in power each year to the rest of Europe—there is ample evidence that the technology can work. Three decades after America abandoned its nuclear effort, "the road not taken" is about to be given another try. ♦

The Moussaoui Dossier

Don't take Osama's word for it.

BY THOMAS JOSCELYN

THIS PAST WEEK, Osama bin Laden released yet another audiotape—his third in the past year. As before, bin Laden focuses on events in the United States, namely, the sentencing of al Qaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui, the only terrorist to be convicted in a U.S. court for involvement in the September 11 attacks. The sentencing phase of Moussaoui's trial created a media circus. With violent rhetoric and bizarre behavior, Moussaoui tried to steal the show by focusing the world's attention on his desire to kill Americans.

Not to be outdone, bin Laden seeks to refocus attention on his own role in directing the September 11 attacks. "I am the one in charge of the 19 brothers," bin Laden says on the tape, "and I never assigned brother Zacarias to be with them in that mission." Furthermore, Moussaoui had "no connection whatsoever" to the 9/11 attacks. What about Moussaoui's confession, which the French citizen and Moroccan native attempted to retract only *after* his sentencing? It was "a false confession," the "result of the pressure put upon him for the past four and a half years," bin Laden claims.

Perhaps the terror master has been reading the *New York Times*. The day after a jury spared Moussaoui the death sentence, giving him life in a Colorado super-max prison, the *Times* praised the decision, saying it seemed to be "the best possible outcome." Why? "For all his bombast," the *Times* argued, "Mr. Moussaoui had no

direct role in the 9/11 attacks. And it is good to know that he will not achieve a fanatic's martyrdom."

To be fair, the *Times* is not alone in this sentiment. Moussaoui's precise role in the September 11 attacks has been the subject of debate ever since he was indicted. Some still believe that Moussaoui was not really preparing to take part in that martyrdom operation at the time of his arrest, just a month before the attacks. But given his conviction, one would think the matter was moot.

Not so. According to the *Washington Post*, doubts about Moussaoui's planned role in September 11 may even have saved his life. One juror told the *Post* that he voted against a death sentence because he thought Moussaoui's "role in 9/11 was actually minor." The jury foreman further explained that "only one juror stood between Moussaoui and death after an 11 to 1 vote." That is, despite having already convicted Moussaoui of involvement in the 9/11 conspiracy, this juror apparently reversed course and decided he wasn't a big enough fish to fry.

There are good reasons to believe this lone juror and the *Times* got it wrong. A host of unchallenged facts tie Moussaoui to the man who acted as a handler for the 9/11 hijackers, Ramzi Binalshibh, in the months leading up to the attack. And while some have tried to portray Moussaoui as merely an al Qaeda wannabe with a penchant for self-aggrandizement, his ties to Ramzi Binalshibh alone should be enough to convince anyone of his participation in the 9/11 plot.

Binalshibh was the intermediary between the hijackers, including their

ringleader Mohammed Atta, and al Qaeda's senior leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11. The money used by the hijackers in their pre-attack preparations flowed through Binalshibh. He also passed information crucial to the plot's execution, including the date chosen for the attack, from the hijackers to their masters and vice versa. Binalshibh was so important to the plot that Atta left the United States in July 2001 to meet with him for 10 days in Spain.

At the same time Binalshibh was managing the final stages of preparations for September 11, he was also keeping tabs on Moussaoui. The federal indictment of Moussaoui makes this clear. Between August 1 and August 3, 2001, Binalshibh wired \$14,000 to Moussaoui from two train stations in Germany. On August 10, Moussaoui paid almost half this amount in cash to Pan Am International Flight Academy in Minneapolis, Minnesota. From August 13 to 15, he attended training courses on a Boeing 747 flight simulator at the academy.

On August 16, Moussaoui was arrested after employees at the academy, who were suspicious of his strange behavior, alerted the FBI. According to the indictment, all of the following were found in his possession: two knives, "fighting gloves and shin guards," "flight manuals for the Boeing 747 Model 400," "a flight simulator computer program," "a piece of paper referring to a handheld Global Positioning System receiver and a camcorder," "software that could be used to review pilot procedures for the Boeing 747 Model 400," "a computer disk containing information related to the aerial application of pesticides," and "a hand-held aviation radio."

Authorities found something else in Moussaoui's possession: "a notebook listing German Telephone #1, German Telephone #2, and the name 'Ahad Sabet.'" Sabet, we now know, was one of the aliases used by Ramzi Binalshibh.

At least one FBI agent, Harry Samit, was convinced Moussaoui was

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preparing for a hijacking at the time of his arrest. Samit is the agent who arrested and initially questioned Moussaoui. On August 17 he warned his superiors at the Bureau, via email, about the Moroccan's intentions. Samit had asked Moussaoui why he was willing to shell out so much cash to learn to fly. Moussaoui's "weak" excuse was that "he just wants to learn how to do it." Samit warned, "That's pretty ominous and obviously suggests some sort of hijacking plan."

Unfortunately, Samit's superiors didn't think it was so obvious. His warnings were largely ignored until after it was too late. Some, including the *Times* and the lone juror interviewed by the *Post*, apparently still don't think it is obvious.

Part of the confusion surrounding Moussaoui's role in 9/11 was sown by the would-be terrorist himself. At first, he denied any involvement in 9/11, arguing that he was to be a part of a second wave of attacks. Later, he changed his story, claiming he really did intend to take part in 9/11. He even claimed that Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber whom Moussaoui had met at London's now infamous Finsbury mosque, was supposed to assist him in flying a hijacked airliner into the White House. Since Moussaoui disclosed his latter story during the course of his trial, when the world was watching, some have claimed he only wanted the attention and adulation of his fellow Islamists.

But a closer look at what the two chief architects of the 9/11 attacks had to say about Moussaoui lays the issue to rest. Binalshibh was captured after a prolonged gunfight in Pakistan in 2002 and has been in U.S. custody ever since. Although he has been held in a secret location, we know what Binalshibh had to say about Moussaoui's role in 9/11 thanks to the 9/11 Commission report.

Initially, Binalshibh intended to take part in the operation as one of the hijackers, but he was denied an entry visa to the United States. According to Binalshibh, "Moussaoui was to take his place as another pilot in the 9/11

operation." The 9/11 Commission further explained:

Recounting a post-9/11 discussion with KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] in Kandahar, Binalshibh claims KSM mentioned Moussaoui as being part of the 9/11 operation. Although KSM never referred to Moussaoui by name, Binalshibh understood he was speaking of the operative to whom Binalshibh had wired money. Binalshibh says KSM did not approve of Moussaoui but believes KSM did not remove him from the operation only because Moussaoui had been selected and assigned by Bin Ladin himself.

Bin Laden claims in his most recent tape that had Moussaoui really known anything about the 9/11 operation at the time of his arrest, al Qaeda would have called off the attack. "Brother Moussaoui was arrested two weeks before the events," bin Laden says, "and if he had known something—even very little—about the 9/11 group, we would have informed the leader of the operation, Mohammed Atta, and the others . . . to leave America before being discovered."

But Binalshibh explained that the reality of the situation was precisely the opposite. Bin Laden and KSM didn't know Moussaoui had been arrested, hence the attack went ahead. According to the 9/11 Commission report:

KSM did not hear about Moussaoui's arrest until after September 11. According to Binalshibh, had Bin Ladin and KSM learned prior to 9/11 that Moussaoui had been detained, they might have canceled the operation. When Binalshibh discussed Moussaoui's arrest with KSM after September 11, KSM congratulated himself on not having Moussaoui contact the other operatives, which would have compromised the operation. Moussaoui had been in contact with Binalshibh, of course, but this was not discovered until after 9/11.

The 9/11 Commission report tells us that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's story differed substantially from Binalshibh's. KSM claimed that

Moussaoui was really going to be part of a "second wave" of attacks. But the commissioners had good reasons not to buy his version of events:

KSM denies ever considering Moussaoui for the planes operation. Instead he claims that Moussaoui was slated to participate in a "second wave" of attacks. KSM also states that Moussaoui had no contact with Atta, and we are unaware of evidence contradicting this assertion.

Yet KSM has also stated that by the summer of 2001, he was too busy with the planes operation to continue planning for any second-wave attacks. Moreover, he admits that only three potential pilots were ever recruited for the alleged second wave, Moussaoui plus two others who, by midsummer of 2001, had backed out of the plot.

We therefore believe that the effort to push Moussaoui forward in August 2001 lends credence to the suspicion that he was being primed as a possible pilot in the immediate planes operation.

In short, there is a lot less mystery about what Moussaoui was up to than the media have allowed readers to believe. The jury knew what it was doing when it convicted him of being a 9/11 conspirator. The real mystery is why anyone at this late date is willing to take Osama bin Laden at his word. ♦



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Polygamy Versus Democracy

You can't have both

BY STANLEY KURTZ

It took a television series about a Viagra-popping patriarch with three friendly/jealous wives and tightly scheduled evenings to set off a serious public debate about polygamy. And that was precisely the intention of the creators of this now infamous television show—no, not *Big Love*, the American series that debuted on HBO in March, but *'Ailat Al-Hagg Metwalli* (Hagg Metwalli's Family), an Egyptian serial that stirred emotions and sparked a bitter debate about polygamy in the Muslim world during the holy month of Ramadan 2001.

The drama heats up when fiftysomething Metwalli Said, longtime husband of three, decides to court a young woman, Samira, in the hope of making her his fourth wife. Unbeknownst to Metwalli, Samira is in love with his own son, who is eventually forced by his father to forsake Samira to marry the daughter of a relative (as is often preferred in Muslim societies). Metwalli's Viagra-induced heart attack brings the story to a head.

Metwalli's polygamy serves as a kind of Rorschach test of Muslim modernization. Studying viewer responses to this serial, Norwegian historian of religion Anne Sofie Roald found that assimilated Muslim immigrant women in the West see Metwalli as a dictator: running around on his wives, forcing them to give up their jobs, forbidding them to leave the house without permission, selfishly forcing his son out of a love marriage, and generally insisting that his word is law.

Yet some unassimilated Muslim immigrant women in Europe, and many Muslim men, admire Metwalli for successfully embodying polygamy as authorized by Islam. Metwalli follows the Koranic precepts: telling all of his wives that he loves them, materially supporting them well and equally, and generally managing his fami-

ly in the interests of all. Even Metwalli's son eventually comes around: Affection burgeons in his arranged marriage after his wife bears him a child.

The Ramadan TV special the year after *'Ailat Al-Hagg Metwalli*—another Egyptian serial, this one based on the infamous anti-Semitic forgery the Protocols of the Elders of Zion—was widely reported and discussed in the West. Yet the polygamy serial is at least as revealing. For one thing, it serves as a reminder that in Muslim immigrant enclaves in Europe, Middle Eastern TV is often the entertainment of choice. In Denmark, for example, Muslim immigrants who might otherwise be watching the local media and absorbing democratic values watch fare such as *'Ailat Al-Hagg Metwalli* via satellite dish or on the Arabic-language cable channels provided for segregated Muslim communities in Scandinavia.

More important, the popular series stirred discussion of polygamy. Around 2001, probably less than 3 percent of men in Egypt had more than one wife. Yet this series glamorizing polygamy set off fear among Muslim women who felt themselves potentially subject to a husband's second marriage. The serial stimulated pro-polygamy sentiment as well. Supporters, including the show's creators, argued that polygamy is a religiously proper alternative to adultery, divorce, and remarriage, and a real answer for the many unmarried women who might otherwise have no chance at motherhood. Opponents replied that polygamy opens the way to marital discord, divorce, and the consequent destitution and abandonment of women and children.

And that's just among Muslims. In the United States, years before *Big Love* made plural marriage fodder for mass entertainment, a debate over polygamy was already underway in the law journals. Today, the dominant school of thought in American family law favors recognition for the egalitarian practice of multipartner union known as "polyamory." And since the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*, which voided laws

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Corbis / John P. Soule

A Mormon man with his six wives, circa 1885

criminalizing sodomy, law journals have begun to publish calls for the decriminalization, regulation, and recognition of the “patriarchal polygamy” practiced today by so-called fundamentalist Mormons (but vigorously condemned by the mainstream Mormon church). Justice Scalia’s stinging dissent in *Lawrence* warned that the Court’s general disallowance of morals-based legislation was bound to call into question laws against polygamy. And so it has.

Given the post-*Lawrence* trend of the law journals, the success of *Big Love* (recently renewed for a second season), and calls for the legalization of polygamy by commentators at mainstream news outlets like *USA Today* and the *New York Times*, it has become necessary to offer a case against polygamy. That case will take us back in time and around the world. It will allow us to compare, on the one hand, the traditional patriarchal polygamy of many tribal peoples, Muslims, and nineteenth-century Mormons with, on the other hand, the free-form plural marriage advocated by “diversity” radicals today. Along the way, it will cast light not only on our domestic debates about marriage, but also on the war on terror and even the meaning of democracy itself.

Polygamy in American Law

The growing legal literature advocating the decriminalization of traditional polygamy was encapsulated by George Washington University

law professor Jonathan Turley in a widely noticed October 2004 op-ed for *USA Today*. Turley argued that, as a simple matter of equal treatment under law, polygamy ought to be legal. Acknowledging that underage girls are sometimes coerced into polygamous marriages, Turley replied that “banning polygamy is no more a solution to child abuse than banning marriage would be a solution to spousal abuse.” Like Turley, the law review literature argues that traditional polygamy is not intrinsically abusive, and can therefore be sufficiently policed through existing laws against incest, statutory rape, and child abuse. *Big Love*, set in a suburb of Salt Lake City, dramatizes this argument by contrasting the “good” polygamy practiced by Bill Henrickson and his three wives with the abusive polygamy in “the compound” nearby controlled by a traditionalist patriarchal figure.

But the law journals do more than merely separate good polygamy from bad polygamy. The law review literature puts forward what we might call the “conservative case” for polygamy. (See, for example, Alyssa Rower’s “The Legality of Polygamy” and Samantha Slark’s “Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests of Consenting Adults?”) The argument is that the abuses of polygamy flourish amidst the isolation, stigma, and secrecy spawned by criminalization. By legitimizing polygamy and allowing its practitioners to join mainstream society, we can monitor and regulate the practice, thereby reducing any problems. On

Big Love, for example, one polygamous wife won't visit a hospital for fear of alerting the authorities. Legalize polygamy, the argument goes, and marriage and divorce law will protect polygamous wives, instead of scaring them into hiding.

Of course, liberal law professors aren't defending polygamy out of affection for patriarchy. Their goal is to establish the principle that individuals have the right to create and define their families as they see fit. Ultimately, that would put same-sex marriage, polyamory, nonsexual group partnerships, and even singlehood on a par with traditional marriage, resulting in the effective abolition of marriage itself as a legal status.

So, for example, in her 2005 brief for legalized polygamy in the *San Diego Law Review*, Colby College professor of philosophy Cheshire Calhoun is careful to note that multipartner unions are by no means necessarily patriarchal, but would be available to lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, as well as heterosexual women with more than one partner. Likewise, Harvard political theorist Nancy Rosenblum assures us that legalized polygamy will give rise to "subversive" counterpatriarchal forms of group sex and domestic life, perfect for promoting true "democracy." In effect, Calhoun and Rosenblum see legalized patriarchal polygamy as a backdoor route to recognition for egalitarian polyamory. Commenting on Calhoun, University of Texas law professor Sanford Levinson goes further, welcoming the prospect of communal marriages organized around mutual care rather than sex, among the middle aged and elderly.

Reynolds v. United States

So there is increasing recognition among legal professionals that, along the way to achieving the full-fledged deconstruction of marriage promised by free-form polyamory, it is necessary to make a case for "patriarchal" polygamy as well. *Big Love* is a product of this line of thinking. As long as traditional polygamy is illegal, the way is also barred to postmodern polyamory. And although *Lawrence v. Texas* may have opened the door to polygamy, one great legal obstacle to the slide down the slippery slope remains: *Reynolds v. United States*, the 1878 Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of antipolygamy laws. That is why *Reynolds* is target number one of the new wave of advocacy for legalized polygamy/polyamory. *Reynolds* has long been in the crosshairs of an older wave of polygamy advocacy as well. Harvard's Laurence Tribe is only the most prominent of a group of old-line liberal legal scholars who have long called for constitutional protection of polygamy on libertarian grounds.

Reynolds v. United States is a landmark decision. It was the first Supreme Court case to clarify the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom by limiting that freedom to beliefs, rather than social practices (like polygamy or suttee, the former Hindu custom of burning widows alive on their husband's funeral pyre). Interestingly, *Reynolds* also defends the idea that American democracy rests upon specific family structures, which are legitimately protected by law. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing for a unanimous Court in *Reynolds*, quotes Francis Lieber, the most respected American legal authority of the day: "Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, . . . which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy."

Although *Reynolds* justifies prohibitions of polygamy by grounding them in a compelling state interest in protecting the social preconditions of democracy, *Reynolds* is nowadays dismissed as mere bigotry. Writers like Turlay single out the following passage as evidence of the *Reynolds* Court's racism: "Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and . . . was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. . . . [F]rom the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an offense against society." Critics like Yale historian Nancy Cott point out that Francis Lieber owned slaves. Thus, Lieber's arguments, and Chief Justice Waite's invocation of "odious" African polygamy, are used as proof that *Reynolds* was motivated by racial animus, rather than social utility. And if shown to be based on racial animus and moral opprobrium, rather than rational state interest, *Reynolds* would be swept aside by *Lawrence*, thus making way for polygamy, polyamory, and full-fledged marriage diversity in the United States.

Yet the critics are wrong. There is a deep connection between monogamy and democracy, a link easily separated from nineteenth-century racial attitudes. Even the presumed prejudice of the period is less than meets the eye. The *Reynolds* Court carefully reviewed jury selection procedures in the polygamy case to make sure that passions and prejudice had been screened out. And Francis Lieber's antislavery views eventually led him to move to the North, where he spoke and wrote as an abolitionist.

Francis Lieber's idea that certain social practices "fetter a people in stationary despotism" was widely shared at the time, and resonates with our contemporary interest in democracy promotion. The great liberal political philosopher John Stuart Mill (whose mentor,



Getty Images / Ravell Call

Utah polygamist Tom Green with 13 of his 29 children and one of his five wives in 1995

Jeremy Bentham, was part of Lieber's European circle) frequently contrasts the "improving" (today we'd say "developed") character of Western democracies with the "stationary states" of Africa and Asia. In *On Liberty*, Mill explicitly attributes this difference to social structure, rather than racial inheritance.

In short, *Reynolds v. United States* was rightly decided. While America's Founders took it for granted that marriage was a monogamous, heterosexual institution, the *Reynolds* Court, under pressure from nineteenth-century polygamy, wisely created constitutional doctrine allowing the state to defend a specific family form. Confirming and building on the insights of *Reynolds*, we shall see why polygamy and polyamory alike are inimical to American democracy, and how non-Western marital practices hamper democratization, even today.

The Mormon Question

Modern Mormonism's success is certified by the emergence of Mitt Romney, a Mormon governor from Massachusetts—heartland of nineteenth-century antipolygamy sentiment—as a presidential contender. A glance at Mormonism's largely forgotten history reveals the magnitude of the transformation.

The *Reynolds* Court was not speaking theoretically when it declared that polygamy could "fetter a people in stationary despotism." Prior to statehood, Utah was a de facto theocracy. For all their differences, Brigham Young and Chief Justice Waite would have agreed that monogamy and polygamy give rise to divergent governing principles.

Brigham Young was simultaneously head of the church, governor of the Utah Territory, and a member of the boards of major businesses. Young decided where his followers lived, the crops they grew, where they shopped, the professions they chose—and who they married. There was little government beyond the church's structure. Religious leaders schooled their families privately, while most of the territory's children remained illiterate. Elections were understood not as forums for debate and decision, but as occasions for popular acclamation of God's choice.

Underlying all this was a deeply communal ethic: Men and women were willing to defer to the church's leadership for the sake of the broader Mormon society, even in so personal a matter as marriage—within which, of course, wives deferred to husbands. To antipolygamists, this was neither capitalism nor democracy, but a

substitution of the rule of men for the rule of laws. Indeed, the ability of church leaders to command personal sacrifice and disobedience to U.S. law fueled resistance to federal enforcement of *Reynolds*.

The 12-year federal drive to enforce *Reynolds* was far more than a quest to root out polygamy. In effect, the fight against polygamy was a slow, frustrating, expensive, ultimately successful campaign to democratize Utah. (The parallels to the war on terror are eerie.) As federal agents descended on Utah, the Mormon leadership went underground, sleeping in hay ricks, hiding under floorboards, dispersing to remote mountain valleys, communicating in code, and depending on early warnings from a sympathetic populace.

Given the demonstration effect of the Civil War, polygamists knew that armed resistance was futile. Yet by evading capture and withholding the evidence needed for conviction, the Mormon leadership hoped to win a legal war of attrition. Still, Mormon resistance was limited by the fear of provoking a full-fledged military occupation, and by the thirst for statehood.

For the better part of a decade, polygamist resistance seemed unbreakable. The railroads were supposed to bring civilization (a nineteenth-century version of globalization and the Internet). Instead they brought more Mormon converts. Elections and the female franchise were supposed to sweep polygamy aside. Instead, pious women and unlettered men voted to solidify the church's power. Then the outlines of a demographic nightmare emerged. With a fertility boom fueled by four decades of polygamy, Utah's population was spilling into Idaho, Oregon, New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming. Mormons bragged that, with the admission of the territories, they would hold the balance of power in a politically divided America.

Back East, these threats provoked a tougher line. Attending to the social and economic foundations of Mormon power, Congress set out to break polygamist rule. By 1833, the disestablishment of churches in the American states was complete, and it had been accomplished partly by state legislatures' setting limits to the churches' business and property holdings. Congress now applied these standards to the Utah Territory, modeling its legislation on the original "mortmain" laws that had curbed church power in England. In this way, church control of Utah's economy was dissolved, and erstwhile church property was used to fund public education, with a curriculum designed around democratic values.

The result was capitulation. With the economic and social foundations of theocracy destroyed, a shooting war unwinnable, and the quest for statehood hanging in

the balance, the Mormons renounced polygamy and set themselves on the path to democracy.

Love

While the broader battle with the Mormons was over democracy, both sides were largely driven by the polygamy controversy. We forget how big this issue was. Antipolygamy sentiment helped found the Republican party in 1854. Republicans called slavery and polygamy "twin relics of barbarism," and Lincoln attacked Douglas over both issues in the campaign of 1860. Today we watch polygamy on TV, but in the mid-1800s, antipolygamy novels were all the rage. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle rode the wave in 1887, when his first story about the detective Sherlock Holmes, *A Study in Scarlet*, featured an antipolygamy twist.

Why were Americans outraged by polygamy? In a word, because of love. The idea of love as central to marriage, by no means common in the world at large, has a long history in the West, going back to the Bible, notably the letters of Paul. Even so, romantic love as the fundamental pillar of marriage (alongside parenthood, of course) truly came into its own in the mid-nineteenth century. Polygamy was an offense against love, the structural glue of American marriage. To those who valued companionate love, polygamy seemed little better than slavery.

Far from denying this, Mormon theorists openly attacked the romantic sensibility. Polygamist leaders called on Mormons to sacrifice selfish and disruptive romantic desires, building marriages instead on simple friendship and piety. Women who embraced polygamy understood this sacrifice of love as a trial to be endured, if a noble one. Like Muslims today, Mormons touted polygamy as an alternative to prostitution and out-of-wedlock births, and a boon to women facing a dearth of truly marriageable men. And like today's proponents of same-sex marriage, polygamists and their apologists chided opponents as hypocrites bent on the "consecutive polygamy" of divorce and remarriage.

Yet these arguments fell flat with most Americans, for whom romantic and companionate love was a cardinal aspiration. The Civil War had proven the dangers of fundamental moral differences between regions, and the threat of polygamy was clear. So long as multipartner marriage was deemed legitimate, the ethos of monogamous companionate marriage was at risk.

The problem was neither theoretical nor confined to the Utah Territory. Today we take monogamy for granted. Yet for much of the nineteenth century, monogamy was questioned by "free lovers" on the cultural left, as well as by Mormons on the cultural right. While the

Mormon kingdom was growing out west, an array of proto-socialist communal experiments in “free love” were cropping up in other parts of the country. These ventures were widely and heatedly debated. Virtually all free love communities were evanescent. Yet the experiments continued for decades, so that in nineteenth-century America, it was not taken for granted that monogamous marriage would retain its cultural preeminence.

Free love was clearly on the minds of the anti-polygamy novelists. And some scholars think a passage in the *Reynolds* decision may have alluded to the famous Oneida community’s quasi-socialist experiment in “complex marriage.” (Complex marriage involved varied sexual pairings, sometimes arranged by request, with the help of third parties, but often assigned by the community’s leader. As a birth control measure, men had to have special permission from the leader to ejaculate during intercourse. Steady pairing within the group was strongly discouraged.) *Reynolds* had the effect of ending both Mormon polygamy and free love experiments in the rest of the country. It emboldened Oneida’s opponents, and soon after *Reynolds* the Oneida community itself voted to end complex marriage.

Reynolds resolved America’s monogamy question for a century. Yet it is worth remembering that the issue has been undecided for much of our history. Today’s emerging alternatives of monogamy, “patriarchal” polygamy, and polyamory largely recreate the options of democratic monogamy, theocratic Mormon polygamy, and quasi-socialist free love that warred for decades in the nineteenth century, until the *Reynolds* court resolved the conflict.

The question is: Did *Reynolds* actually safeguard the structure of American marriage, and with it our democratic culture? Or—as is so often argued today—was the court’s opposition to multipartner marriage mere bigotry? Consider our best account of the polygamy controversy, Sarah Barringer Gordon’s *The Mormon Question* (on which I’ve drawn here). Gordon is torn between the impulse to attribute opposition to polygamy to mere prejudice, and a grudging acknowledgment that much of what the critics of polygamy had to say about the old Mormon system was true. The problem is that neither Gordon nor the law professors are inclined to treat arguments about marriage and social structure as anything but rhetoric. The *Reynolds* Court knew better. And contemporary experience suggests they were right.

Africa in Paris

Perhaps between 200,000 and 400,000 of France’s five-million-plus Muslims live in polygamous families. When workers were needed to stoke

Europe’s post-World War II economic boom, France freely granted visas to family members of polygamous immigrants. Problems of assimilation and delinquency developed and eventually prompted France to ban polygamy in 1993. Yet the law has been only intermittently enforced, and many polygamous wives continue to enter the country illegally. Polygamous immigrants come largely from sub-Saharan countries like Mali, Senegal, and Gambia. Most settle in ethnic enclaves in the poorer suburbs of Paris.

Polygamous husbands long resident in France still fetch young wives from rural African villages. These women have little formal education or command of French, and often live isolated lives, leaving home only to shop, visit their children’s schools, or seek medical care. In Africa, co-wives and their children generally live in separate houses or huts. But housing costs in France force families of 20 or more to share tiny apartments, where tensions between co-wives run high. Child supervision is limited and delinquency is common. In extreme cases, children sleep in shifts, making school attendance all but impossible.

Like the early Mormons, transplanted African polygamists frown on romantic love. If a man favors a barren wife over one who’s produced children, the barren woman may be suspected of seducing her husband through sorcery. In Africa, accusations of witchcraft concentrate in polygamous families living under the same roof. This carries over to France, where life in cramped apartments often leads women to interpret stomach pains as antifertility sorcery by a co-wife.

Despite the 1993 ban, by the time of the Paris riots in the fall of 2005, polygamy had become a taboo topic for mainstream French politicians. Raising questions about the real-world effects of family structure was stigmatized as bigotry by civil rights advocates and French Muslims alike. Yet after riots broke out in the suburban enclaves where polygamous families concentrate, Bernard Accoyer, parliamentary leader of President Jacques Chirac’s party, gingerly pointed to polygamy as one of several causes of the disturbances. Various prominent politicians and scholars followed suit.

No sooner had the taboo on discussion of polygamy been broken than a furor ensued. “Antiracism” groups called the comments “sickening and irresponsible.” “These accusations shame the nation,” said the powerful MRAP (French Movement against Racism and for Friendship Among Peoples). MRAP threatened to bring legal action against the historian Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, permanent secretary of the prestigious French Academy, for her suggestion that large families with little parental supervision crammed into small

apartments had played a role in the disturbances. (Hate-speech lawsuits are a favorite device of the French left for shutting down public debate.)

The attack from the left, and pressure from France's allies in Africa (where public anger at the polygamy remarks ran high), quickly forced President Chirac, through a spokesman, to distance his government from the controversy. When Chirac arrived in Mali for a December 2005 summit, he personally ruled out any connection between polygamy and the riots. Yet Chirac's government has proposed a law that would make it more difficult for French residents to bring in foreign spouses and children. And Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy have issued repeated calls for stricter enforcement of the polygamy ban.

Post-World War II France was not about to imitate nineteenth-century America's outrage at polygamy. Intentionally turning a blind eye to the practice, the French assumed that any social implications would be trivial. Yet France's most respected leaders now find it difficult even to speak openly about what has obviously become a serious social problem. And the legal ban has lost its bite. With a critical mass of practitioners on French soil and able to vote (or riot), and with the left seizing on polygamy as a civil rights issue, enforcement of the ban is in doubt, no matter how it's strengthened on paper.

Ever since the attacks 40 years ago on the Moynihan Report, with its prophetic warning over the collapsing black family in America, it has been difficult to raise questions about the social implications of family structure without being excoriated for bigotry. This hinders the debate over gay marriage in the United States as well as the controversy over polygamy in France. Yet among immigrants across Europe, polygamy has proven itself incompatible with democratic values. The *Reynolds* Court is being vindicated again before our eyes.

But why? What exactly is it about polygamy that militates against democracy? And can the problem really be solved, as the radical law professors argue, by transforming patriarchal polygamy into postmodern polyamory? On this matter, experience in Canada is relevant.

The Canadian Debate

Amidst the Canadian government's push for same-sex marriage in 2005, Justice Minister Irwin Cotler famously declared, "We don't see any connection, I repeat, any connection, between the issue of polygamy and the issue of same-sex marriage." To prove it, Cotler commissioned four separate studies of polygamy by legal scholars and civil rights groups. Cotler got his comeuppance in

January 2006, when a freedom of information request forced release of the four studies in the middle of an election campaign. To the embarrassment of Canada's ruling Liberal party, a firestorm erupted over a report advocating the decriminalization and regulation of polygamy. Actually, the press missed half the story, since two of the four studies favored decriminalization. A look at one report on each side of the controversy will help unravel the mystery of the antagonism between polygamy and democracy.

The first report is the work of an opponent of polygamy, Queen's University law professor Nicholas Bala (and his associates). Bala draws on the social science literature to support his claim that polygamy is inherently harmful to women and children. Trouble is, the literature is divided on this question.

Bala relies heavily on the work of Alean Al-Krenawi, an Israeli professor of clinical social work who's conducted numerous studies of polygamy among the Bedouin Arabs of Israel's Negev desert. Al-Krenawi makes a powerful case that, among the Bedouin, senior wives and their children suffer when junior wives enter polygamous families. First marriages among the Bedouin are parentally arranged alliances, often between cousins or other relatives. Second marriages are self-arranged, and more likely to reflect the husband's choice. So it's particularly difficult for a senior wife when a new wife comes on board. Senior wives have high incidences of depression and anxiety, and their children do poorly in school. In general, Al-Krenawi's data show Bedouin wives and children in polygamous families to be worse off than those in monogamous families.

Yet it's tough to generalize from Al-Krenawi's findings. There are plenty of societies where co-wives are friendly (if also jealous), happily collaborating on chores and child-rearing. In some cultures, senior wives help choose junior wives, and welcome them for the household help they bring. Recent studies by Al-Krenawi and others show that the negative effects of Bedouin polygamy on children disappear by adolescence, as older children and extended family members step in as surrogate parents. Bala downplays all this.

Good Polygamy?

Around the time she signed a public letter from Canadian law professors in support of same-sex marriage, McGill University law professor Angela Campbell submitted her report to the Canadian government recommending the decriminalization of polygamy. Campbell has read the same social science research as Bala, yet she turns it to radically different purposes. Campbell highlights the problems with generalizing from Al-Krenawi's work, while noting that the anthropological literature makes it tough to characterize

polygamy as either all good or all bad. So don't go after polygamy itself, says Campbell. Target individual abuses.

Campbell builds her case on an article by University of Colorado research associate Sangeetha Madhavan. Madhavan worked in Mali, among some of the same groups that send polygamous immigrants to the suburbs of Paris. By comparing two nearby societies, the Fulbe and the Bamanan, Madhavan shows that the experience of women in polygamy differs, depending on context. The Fulbe structure families in a way that increases competition among co-wives. But among the Bamanan, families are organized to minimize jealousy and encourage collaboration. For Campbell, this proves that polygamy itself is not the problem.

Yet Campbell never stops to ask what it takes to make polygamy work. The answer: a set of rules and attitudes that could never be imported to North America, except in the few closed, authoritarian communities where "patriarchal" polygamy actually flourishes today. The Bamanan deflect jealousy by deemphasizing love. Bamanan marriages are arranged by families, and a sleep-rotation schedule damps down individual attachments. Economic success depends on having a large family labor force, and jealousy over newcomers is countered by apprenticing junior wives to senior wives, who closely supervise their daily work.

This same emphasis on rules and hierarchy within a tightly bound group explains why the Bedouin children studied by Al-Krenawi turn out all right. Things get better when Bedouin kids grow up and receive surrogate parenting from their extended kin. But that depends on giving up what Al-Krenawi calls "the Western liberal conception of individual autonomy." To get all that surrogate parenting, the Bedouin adopt an "authoritarian and group-oriented" identification with an extended family and tribe. And consider "sororal polygamy," easily the most emotionally successful variant of polygamy world-wide. In sororal polygamy, a man marries a set of sisters, minimizing jealousy. It's a clever strategy, but just try adapting such kin-based preferences and arranged marriages to the United States.

Alexis de Tocqueville, that great nineteenth-century student of America, pointed to the abolition of primogeniture (exclusive property inheritance by first-born sons) as the social key to American democracy. Once American children inherited equally, said Tocqueville, landed estates were dispersed, and the ethos of kin unity and hierarchy was replaced by a spirit of democratic equality. Yet America's abolition of primogeniture was only the culmination of a process begun centuries earlier by the Christian Church. Muslim families arrange marriages to cousins and other kin, thereby reinforcing couples' identification

with family and tribe. But from the fourth century through the Middle Ages, the Church fought to protect individual choice in marriage, while prohibiting marriage between cousins and other relatives. That undercut social forms based on kinship and collective identity, ultimately leading to the triumph of democratic individualism in the West.

Yet the weakening or even disappearance of extended kinship groups from family life in the West poses a problem. If families aren't going to be held together by collective honor, mutual obligation, and shared economic interest, how will they cohere? The answer is love. Exclusive affection for a unique individual is the structural foundation on which Western families are built. In polygamous societies, where marriages are arranged and wives and children live collectively, too much individualized love (for spouses or children) endangers group solidarity. Yet in a democratic society, individualized love is praised and cultivated as the foundation of family stability. So take your pick. You can have a love-based democratic culture of monogamy, or an authority-based hierarchical culture of polygamy. But—as the *Reynolds* Court knew—you can't have both.

Polyamory

Far from offering a democratic solution to the problem of multipartner unions, egalitarian polyamory simply reveals another face of the polygamy dilemma. It is inherently difficult to keep multipartner unions together. The traditional solution is to rely on rules, clear lines of authority, the suppression of emotion, and a sense of obligation to kin. Collective solidarity is the material and spiritual payoff for all the sacrifice. Yet the polyamorists cultivate love, resist authority, dispense with organizational rules, and try to wish jealousy away. Once all the stability-inducing sacrifices have been dispensed with, impermanence is the inevitable result.

Polyamory is a cover-all term for a bewildering variety of relationship forms—everything from open marriage, to bisexual triads, to a man with multiple women, to a woman with multiple men, to large sexual groups, and many more. The "rules" governing these arrangements are entirely flexible. There might be three "primary" partners who actually live together, and several additional "secondary" partners (collectively shared or not) to whom the three "primaries" are less committed. The levels of commitment, and the range of partnership and mutual involvement, are subject to continual change and renegotiation. Open and honest communication is the only rule. Polyamorists emphasize that multipartner unions take intense and constant work. Yet this need for

a higher level of monitoring and negotiation only highlights the forces pushing against stability.

The contrast between postmodern polyamory and the patriarchal polygamy of Muslim fundamentalists resembles the nineteenth-century duality of “free love” and Mormon polygamy. Mormon plural unions were authoritarian and relatively stable (although even in the nineteenth century they had very high divorce rates). The free love experiments nearly all collapsed after a few short months or years, although new experiments were generated continually for decades. That record of instability was repeated when the hippie communes of the 1960s and 70s fell apart.

This might not matter were it not for the problem of children. Family stability is highly desirable for children. Not only would legally recognized polyamory be unstable, but the legitimization of polyamory would also be incompatible with one of our core reasons for giving marriage the backing of law at all: to reinforce monogamy as a cultural value.

You can't send the message that marriage means fidelity when even a small portion of recognized marriages are polyamorous. The reliance of Western marriage systems on monogamous companionate love for stability is all but ignored by the advocates of polyamory, who have little or nothing to say about children. Over and above prevention of individual abuses, protection of the broader cultural ethos of monogamy is the reason both polygamy and polyamory must go unrecognized in America. Democratic culture depends on monogamous marriage. The alternatives are either too authoritarian to be adapted to our society or so hyper-individualist that they cannot perform the work of families. And recognition of either alternative would undermine the monogamy on which the stability of American marriage depends.

But if democracy depends on monogamy, what does that tell us about introducing democracy to non-Western cultures?

Marriage and Terror

The long, frustrating, yet spectacularly successful campaign to democratize the Utah Territory by changing its marriage practices holds lessons for us still. Elections and the threat or use of force are only part of what it takes to turn an authoritarian society around. Over time, the social and economic foundations of undemocratic rule must be weakened or circumvented. An actual desire to join the democratic universe must take root.

Many of the Muslim immigrants drawn to Europe after World War II by what, for them, were spectacularly

high-paying jobs had no intention of becoming Europeans. Their plan was to remit a portion of their salaries to family in Asia or Africa and eventually return home. When, instead, these workers imported their families to Europe, their mindset barely changed. We know something about how religious belief, satellite television from the Middle East and North Africa, and the seclusion of women have walled off Europe's Muslims from their cultural surroundings. Yet few realize the extent to which marriage practices organize and explain this larger pattern of isolation.

Muslim polygamy in France is a dramatic illustration of the broader link between non-Western marriage practices and failed assimilation. Partners for polygamous marriages are easy to find in Africa, where young women who accept polygamy seize the opportunity to reach Europe via marriage. Over time, the Africa-France conveyor belt prevents resident immigrants from assimilating through intermarriage, while simultaneously importing a continuous supply of immigrants unfamiliar with European language and culture. Secluded indoors, with limited knowledge of the society around them, polygamous wives can barely supervise their French-born children. Naturally, unassimilated immigrants gravitate to the more culturally familiar world portrayed by entertainment from abroad.

Tocqueville and the *Reynolds* Court understood that particular family structures yield “habits of the heart” compatible or at odds with democracy. Yet the connection is complex. India is home to a lively democracy, but is also a land of marriages arranged through kin and caste. The British planted the seeds of Indian democracy by creating a small but powerful professional class whose advancement depended on education and merit, rather than kin ties. Democratization in the Middle East, and Muslim assimilation in Europe, are going to require that kind of attention to the underlying barriers to change—none more powerful than kin ties and marriage practices. Yet seeing family issues through the prism of individual civil rights, we've forgotten that marriage practices have real-world consequences.

An End Game

The new wave of *Big Love*-inspired talk about polygamy is directly attributable to the campaign for same-sex marriage. *Big Love* was created by a pair of gay-marriage advocates, who use the show to highlight the analogy between same-sex unions and polygamy. And *Big Love* is merely a hint of things to come. Radicals have long seen same-sex marriage as a lever with which to break the grip of monogamy. Should gay marriage be safely legalized, the radicals will emerge

in force. Mainstream liberals like Sanford Levinson (who has a soft spot for experiments in multipartner marriage) openly advise the gay marriage movement to distance itself from marriage radicalism until after gay marriage is legalized. *Big Love* notwithstanding, that advice is largely heeded.

A few same-sex marriage advocates pretend that by simply offering rational reasons to oppose polygamy, they can neutralize the dangers of the slippery-slope. Multi-partner unions breed jealousy and marital instability, says *Slate*'s William Saletan. True, but that hasn't stopped polyamorists from mimicking the argument of gay marriage advocates: Take away the stigma of non-recognition, and our unions will be as stable as yours. Polygamy deprives men of marriage partners, says *National Journal* columnist Jonathan Rauch. Potentially, yes, especially in small closed communities. But in a huge country where growing numbers of men don't marry, and many are unmarriageable, polygamists will make their usual claim to have solved the dilemma of the unmarried woman. Polyamorists will add that unions of one woman and multiple men will help balance out sex ratios. Rauch points to the historical dearth of polyandry (one woman with multiple men) to argue that this won't happen, but how can he when the gay marriages he favors are themselves historically unprecedented?

More important, by training us to see marriage as a civil rights issue, gay marriage advocates have largely defanged all of these structural arguments. Redefining the family is increasingly seen as a fundamental right. And the courts are beginning to agree. In his prize-winning law review essay "Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy," Michael Myers argues that if the Supreme Court interprets *Lawrence v. Texas* the way the Massachusetts Supreme Court did in its decision legalizing same-sex marriage, the right to polygamy will logically follow.

The solution is to treat marriage as a social institution whose fundamental purpose is to encourage mothers and fathers to build stable families for the children they create. Same-sex marriage breaks this understanding, thus encouraging the sort of unstable parental cohabitation we see in Europe, where cohabiting parents break up at two to three times the rate of married parents. And polygamy undercuts companionate monogamy, the only form of marriage that can function in a modern liberal society. What's needed, then, is the revitalization of a richer understanding of marriage as a culturally specific social form—precisely the approach taken in *Reynolds v. United States*.

Unfortunately, movement is now in the opposite direction. Jonathan Turley's latest opinion piece for *USA*

Today signals an all-too-plausible scenario for the final slide down the slippery slope. In 2004, Turley defended the right to polygamy. Now, in 2006, Turley is calling for the abolition of marriage as a legal status and its replacement by a system of infinitely flexible "civil union" contracts. This general disestablishment of marriage may be the most likely route from here to polygamy.

For now, the taboo on polygamy/polyamory makes it difficult for practitioners to defend themselves publicly. They must rely instead on advocacy by mainstream liberals like Turley. Those who scoff at fear of the slippery slope argue that, whatever the logic of the law, without an active advocacy movement, polygamy and polyamory will never be recognized. Turley himself conceded, a mere year-and-a-half before *Big Love*'s debut, that polygamists would never gain the kind of social acceptance that comes from a sympathetic television show. That spectacularly mistaken prediction underestimated the extent to which polygamists and polyamorists can depend upon help from civil rights advocates, libertarians, lifestyle radicals, and the Hollywood left, all of whom would like to "get the state out of the marriage business."

But Turley's greatest ally may be religious traditionalists themselves, who will push to separate marriage and state once same-sex marriage gains a foothold. With same-sex marriage nationalized, and the emergence of an open polyamorists'-rights movement, traditionalists will demand that the state get out of the marriage business. That might temporarily protect a few traditionalist enclaves, but it would also effectively remove the broader social supports for stable, monogamous, parenthood-focused marriage. If that happens, intentional single-motherhood and European-style parental cohabitation are likely to proliferate, as are a raft of experiments in open marriage, polygamy, and polyamory. Family variety will markedly increase, while family stability will continue to erode. The precipitous decline of marriage already seen in parts of Europe and the African-American community will take hold in mainstream America. Welcome to the bottom of the slope.

Marriage, as its ultramodern critics would like to say, is indeed about choosing one's partner, and about freedom in a society that values freedom. But that's not the only thing it is about. As the Supreme Court justices who unanimously decided *Reynolds* in 1878 understood, marriage is also about sustaining the conditions in which freedom can thrive. Polygamy in all its forms is a recipe for social structures that inhibit and ultimately undermine social freedom and democracy. A hard-won lesson of Western history is that genuine democratic self-rule begins at the hearth of the monogamous family. ♦

The Last Orientalist

Bernard Lewis at 90

BY REUEL MARC GERECHT

It is often said that the United States isn't easy on its scholars and public intellectuals—that they are not accorded the prestige and respect that they are given in the Old World. This complaint, usually made by left-wingers struggling against the tide in the United States, isn't totally without merit. A good literary scholar or classicist in the United States perhaps doesn't quite have the same social cachet as would a similarly accomplished scholar at Oxford or the Sorbonne. But when scholars do make it in the United States—and there certainly seem to be vastly more European scholars hoping to make it in America than Americans trying to snag a sinecure in Europe—there is simply no comparison in the eminence, influence, and renown that they can achieve. Since arriving in the United States in 1974, the British historian of the Middle East Bernard Lewis has become one of America's—and thus the world's—most famous academics.

For those of us seriously interested in the Middle East—and since 9/11 that has become a rather large crowd—Lewis, who will celebrate his 90th birthday on May 31, has attained a stature in the field and with the general reading public unrivaled by any historian, living or dead, of the Middle East and Islam. His range of writings—from the pre-Islamic period, through Islam's classical and medieval ages and its premodern “gunpowder” empires, to today's Muslim nation-states—is simply unparalleled by any other scholar, even from the golden age of Islamic studies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the field's terrifyingly erudite, multilingual European founding fathers—the much despised “orientalists”—bestrode the earth. Lewis is the last and greatest of the orientalists—an awkward, geographically imprecise name for those who gave birth to the disci-

plined study of Islamic civilization. To borrow from Shiite Muslim legal scholarship, Bernard Lewis is the *majma-e taqlid*, “the source of emulation,” the scholar to whom on the great questions one must make reference. He has joined that elite group of academics—the economists Milton Friedman and John Kenneth Galbraith come to mind—who have decisively shaped public discourse, if not always government policy, on their subjects.

This is an odd situation, for reasons both personal and pedagogical. His place in America would not have been predicted 35 years ago, when Lewis was already one of the great dons of Islamic studies, precisely because he is (in all the best senses) so very English—which doesn't always play well in the United States. He is unrelentingly ironic and nuanced, preferring to come at the most consequential of matters obliquely. He is conservative, with a quiet, deep curiosity about small details and the traditions that have evolved and endured over centuries. He is urbane and witty, punctuating the most serious of discussions with subtle, usually mischievous, often mordant humor, gathered and delivered in many languages (translations are provided, though not without occasional frowning). He can be shy and, despite his vast learning, at times arrestingly modest.

These attributes are hard to square with his experiences—few men have read and remembered as much as Lewis has forgotten, or traveled the world as thoroughly, or dined so regularly with the high and mighty—but they nonetheless are attributes that define his character, and make him open to people and places that great men, by the time they become great men, usually can no longer see.

Lewis has gained the broadest fame and notoriety for being the intellectual godfather behind the Bush administration's critique of the Muslim Middle East. To quote Ian Buruma in the *New Yorker*, “if anyone can be said to have provided the intellectual muscle for recent United States policy toward the Middle East it would

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
have to be him.” Pedagogically, this, too, would not have been expected. Lewis’s complicated ideas are not easily compacted and translated into policy prescriptions, by him or others. He has, nevertheless, been for years a man of public affairs. In 1970, Richard Perle, as a young staffer for Washington senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, observed Lewis giving a speech, and was astonished by his eloquence (“most people speak in sentences; he spoke in paragraphs”) and historical reach. Perle later introduced the Englishman to Washington. However, Lewis’s comings and goings in Washington and the media have been relatively quiet for a celebrity scholar. While many of his most vocal academic critics trumpet their appearances before Congress or on cable news programs or at VIP private dinners, experience over decades has taught Lewis (if not his critics, who usually have had less knowledge of the mechanics of American governance) that dinners in Washington rarely translate into policy—at least not policy that *penseurs* would recognize as their own. Lewis dislikes prognostication—the common denominator of policy life in Washington—because an accomplished historian more than others knows the role that blind luck can play in turning history upside down.

And it must be said that the professor’s influence has, in all probability, been overstated—both by his friends and most loudly by those who have emotionally and intellectually been unhinged by the Iraq war. Until President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his former deputy Paul Wolfowitz, and White House speech writer Michael Gerson write their memoirs, we really won’t know to what extent Lewis, directly or indirectly, shaped their views of the Middle East, radical Islam, al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, and the possibilities for a post-Saddam Iraq. (When the Clinton administration was bombing Saddam’s regime on a nearly daily basis in 1998, when its senior officials were routinely describing the damage that the Iraqi dictator could do to us with his WMD programs, was it also under the spell of Professor Lewis?)

I strongly doubt that Wolfowitz, long an advocate of

toppling Saddam Hussein and an admirer and serious student of Lewis, pushed war primarily because of what the professor had written or said about the Middle East. When Wolfowitz remarked that a post-Saddam Iraq would be inclined toward being a more liberal state because over 50 percent of the population was female, that opinion surely didn’t derive from Lewis, who has keenly understood the magnetic power of traditional Islamic teachings for both men and women, even as he has underscored the extraordinarily debilitating effect that Muslim patriarchy, with its multiple wives and concubines, has had on Islamic civilization’s competitiveness. Further from Lewis than Wolfowitz, the president and the vice president in all probability didn’t see the necessity for war against Saddam and the establishment of a functioning democracy after his fall primarily through a Lewisean lens. (Ditto, by the way, for most of the pro-war editors of this magazine.)

Thoughtful observers could easily have favored a policy that aimed to replace the Baathist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, and to rethink America’s reflexive support of the autocratic regimes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where bin Ladenism was born, and been ignorant of the writings of Princeton University’s most famous professor emeritus. This certainly would not have been the ideal intellectual preparation for conflict in the Middle East, but it is a situation that I suspect occurred quite often inside the administration and out. No wild-eyed, Bush-admiring Wilsonian hawk, the *New Yorker*’s George Packer, who chronicled post-Saddam Iraq in his magazine and in the book *The Assassin’s Gate*, doesn’t appear particularly influenced by Bernard Lewis’s *oeuvre*, yet he supported the war, however riddled with angst and foreboding. Ditto for Ken Pollack, the military strategist who now hangs his hat at the liberal Brookings Institution. Pollack’s *The Threatening Storm* in the fall of 2002 was the single most influential book explicitly arguing in favor of war against Saddam Hussein. This work is not an extended essay on the cultural, spiritual, economic, and military decay of the modern Middle East à la Bernard Lewis, yet it is a compelling argument for why sensible men could support the war and the American occupation.



Bernard Lewis

Illustration by Earl Keleny

Although Lewis was certainly in favor of the war (still is), and certainly backed the idea of U.S. support for the establishment of an Iraqi democracy (still does), his views on Muslim history, which are usually expressed in broad brushstrokes that capture several centuries, always have underscored the unrequited expectations of those who would liberalize the modern Middle East. An appreciation of this point was behind the critique done by Buruma, an intellectually serious effort that avoids the anti-Zionist animadversions that have defined most left-of-center critiques of the Princeton professor since 9/11.

Buruma suggests that Lewis's affection for the Muslim Middle East got the better of him, causing him to rashly throw his hitherto conservative intellectual force behind the democracy-through-war project of the Jacobin neocons in the Bush administration. Buruma finds the decision to go to war against Saddam rationally inexplicable, and particularly discordant for Lewis, who has long warned about the dangers of Islamic extremism (per Buruma, the "Iraqi regime was hated by religious extremists"). For years, the professor had written about the obstacles to democratic growth in the Muslim world. But Lewis, it appears, lost his patience and his conservative values because "his beloved civilization is sick." After all, according to Buruma, "what would be more heartwarming to an old Orientalist than to see the greatest Western democracy cure the benighted Muslim?" This, then, is what motivated Lewis's pro-war zeal, "or something less charitable: if a final showdown between the great religions is indeed the inevitable result of a millennial clash [Lewis, not Harvard's Samuel Huntington, originally coined the phrase *clash of civilizations*], then we had better make sure that we win."

Buruma's assessment is the polar opposite of those in the academy who despise Lewis for being insufficiently sensitive to Arabs and Muslims and supportive of Israel. Nonetheless Buruma's reading is a variation of Edward Said's charge against the Princeton scholar—that Lewis advances the "white man's burden"—though out of love, not imperialist motives, as Said claimed. Buruma is undeniably correct in discerning an evolution in Lewis's views since the University of London graduate in 1939 published his dissertation on the Assassins, a medieval heretical Shiite sect that once scared Sunni Muslim potentates from its strongholds in Iran and Syria.

Given the ugly history of the Muslim Middle East since 1945, it would be shocking if the professor's views had not evolved. In 1945, for example, Lewis was not in favor of a Jewish state in Palestine; today, he is, seeing Israel as one of the things that has gone more right than

wrong in the region. What Buruma does not appreciate—and he is far from alone in this—is that Lewis does see the rise of bin Ladenism, and 9/11 in particular, as an epochal event for both Islam and the West.

Although Lewis has *never* advocated the export of democracy by force, he became increasingly focused after 9/11 on the perverse nexus in the Muslim Middle East between tyranny and the growth of Islamic extremism. He understood—because he'd actually been reading the primary material produced by Sunni Wahhabi and Shiite extremists and by Arab dictatorships—that the United States in the 1990s was increasingly seen as weak in the Middle East, and that such perceptions could be lethal. He underscored the extraordinary dangers posed by Saddam's aggressive totalitarian regime, with a proven hunger for weapons of mass destruction, which, lest we forget, was on the verge of escaping, thanks to French and Russian efforts, from its sanctions and isolation. Lewis, a child of 1930s Europe and a profound admirer of Winston Churchill, did not think the United States should make the mistake again that it made in 1991, in failing to finish off the Butcher of Baghdad.

But Lewis's conservatism remains: He is still a qualified advocate of democratic change in the Middle East. Here is the qualification: He understands the centrality of the Koran and the Holy Law to the Islamic identity and Muslim emotions, and he understands that neither—even in the hands of the most brilliant Muslim modernists—is a vehicle for empowering democratic ideals. He does not trust Islamists. It is for this reason, among others, that Lewis has long admired the achievement of Kemal Atatürk, the dictatorial father of the secular (and semidemocratic) Turkish Republic.

Yet Lewis is also aware of the burgeoning democratic discussion in the Muslim Middle East. And he assesses this positively—democracy has become for him an essential part of solving the region's many problems. It is astonishing how many observers of the region choose simply to ignore or diminish the explosion of democratic sentiments that has occurred since the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. These sentiments have not yet transformed the Middle East, but they are a start. I think Lewis's emphasis on secularism and secularists as the all-critical component in democratic transformation may be a little too rigid. Democratic sentiments, however imperfect and self-serving, have embedded themselves to varying degrees even into the *ulama* and lay religious classes in the region. Iraq's Grand Ayatollah

Ali Sistani and the dissident Shiite clergy in Iran are the most famous and probably the most evolved of these religious drivers of democratic change.

Men of religion, I have argued, will advance the democratic movements in the Middle East more effectively than their secularist brethren will. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the font of so much violent Islamic extremism, could well turn out to be the mothership for democratic change in the Sunni Arab world. (Change that will, at least in the short term, send anti-Americanism through the roof, adversely affect liberal, secular social values, and America's military and security relationships with the ruling elite in Cairo.) This is a bit much for Lewis. Nevertheless, it is probably correct to say that his conception of who will drive democracy in the Arab world no longer fits—if it ever did—the Turkish model, which the professor admires and so many in academe dislike, if not loathe. (Though they need not be mutually exclusive, liking Turkey and liking the Arab world are usually fire and water among scholars and among the experts of the State Department and CIA.)

So what is Bernard Lewis's place in history, especially along the Potomac? Undoubtedly, his two short but compendious, bestselling books that appeared after

9/11—*What Went Wrong?* and *The Crisis of Islam*—played a part in helping senior administration officials better understand the historical context of radical Muslims who had embraced terrorism as a means of expressing their faith. His seminal essays on Islamic militancy in the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Commentary*, and the *New Republic* also worked their way into the foreign-policy establishment, even if members of that establishment didn't know the lineage of the views that they expressed.

His bestselling books and post-9/11 articles all hark back to Lewis's greatest work, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, published in 1982. Perhaps the most illuminating book ever written on the Islamic world—a history book that has the chance of being read 50 years from now as closely and as profitably as when it was written—*The Muslim Discovery of Europe* allows the reader to see how Muslims saw the West, from Islam's earliest days to modern times. (*The Muslim Discovery of Europe*'s only real competitor would be *The Venture of Islam*, the three-volume masterpiece by the University of Chicago's late, great Marshall Hodgson.) Lewis's book could have been subtitled *The Origins of Curiosity About Infidels*, for it is a 1,400-year trek through the development of Muslims' encounters with unbelievers. There are many reasons

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
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European civilization raced ahead of other, once-superior civilizations. These reasons all somehow combined to explode the rapacity and range of the West's curiosity, both individually and collectively expressed.

As Lewis regularly points out, the word *curiosity* doesn't really have good equivalents in Islamic languages. The Columbia University literary critic Edward Said, who loathed Lewis and the "orientalist" tradition behind him, never really understood to what degree curiosity (and sympathy)—not dark, imperialist, exploitative motives—drove Western scholarship about the Islamic world, especially during the formative "orientalist" age. A Palestinian Christian Arab by birth, whom Lewis famously debated on stage and dueled in the pages of the *New York Review of Books* in 1982, Said never really understood, either, how Western scholars could be proud, not particularly apologetic patriots and also profoundly respect foreign faiths, cultures, and lands. (Said never understood, as far as that goes, how men of differing views could remain civil. Under Lewis and his close friend Charles Issawi, a phenomenally accomplished scholar of both modern and medieval Islamic history who had fairly sharp political differences with Lewis, Princeton University was a refuge from the Third-Worldist, anti-Israeli political storms that made many Middle Eastern studies departments in America socially and intellectually unpleasant.)

It is impossible for a Westerner to digest Lewis's work without it profoundly affecting how he sees the Muslim Middle East. A determination to use primary material so that Muslims can speak for themselves animates all of Lewis's writings. President Bush's faith in the medicinal value of democracy for Muslims raised under dictatorship undoubtedly has its strongest roots in America's abiding trust in representative government. But Lewis's nuanced writings on democracy in the Muslim world, and his former students and his many friends, who've all absorbed over the years perspectives of the British émigré-turned-American citizen, have probably helped to flesh out the administration's rapidly evolving understanding of Middle Eastern politics and faith after 9/11. (An understanding that may now be vanishing as the Near East Bureau at the State Department regains control of American policy in the Middle East.) Published at the time of the invasion of Iraq, before President Bush's

most important speech in November 2003 about the need for representative government in the Middle East, Lewis's commentary on democracy in *The Crisis of Islam* anticipates and amplifies the president's themes:

The creation of a free society, as the history of existing democracies in the world makes clear, is no easy matter. The experience of the Turkish republic over the last half century and of some other Muslim countries more recently has demonstrated two things: first, that it is indeed very difficult to create a democracy in such a society, and second, that although difficult, it is not impossible. The study of Islamic history and of the vast and rich Islamic political literature encourages the belief that it may well be possible to develop democratic institutions—not necessarily in our Western definition of that much misused term, but in one deriving from their own history and culture and ensuring, in their way, limited government under law, consultation and openness, in a civilized and humane society.

The forces of tyranny and terror are still very strong and the outcome is far from certain. . . . The war against terror and the quest for freedom are inextricably linked, and neither can succeed without the other. The struggle is no longer limited to one or two countries, as some Westerners still manage to believe. It has acquired first a regional then a global dimension, with profound consequences for all of us. . . . If freedom fails and terror triumphs, the peoples of Islam will be the first and greatest victims. They will not be alone, and many others will suffer with them.

Many years ago, when I was still an Iran-watcher in the CIA's clandestine service, I thanked Lewis, who had been my teacher at Princeton, for his writings and the long conversations that he'd so generously had with me. I could respect Iranian holy warriors, who then interested the United States government more than their Sunni counterparts, because the professor had helped me to see them as they really were. He'd taught me how to time travel—to reach back and touch the events, people, and literature that still define so much of the Muslim soul. For a case officer, who feeds on the strengths and weaknesses of foreigners, there was no more valuable gift. With other students of the Middle East and Islam, with the common man who is just curious, and with Democratic and Republican officials in Washington who try to see beyond our borders, and who often are not blessed with keen historical insight, Lewis has been similarly generous and kind. We are all in his debt, and in his shadow. *Kheli tashakkor mikonam*, professor. Happy birthday, Bernard. ♦

Edward Said, who loathed Lewis and the "orientalist" tradition behind him, never really understood to what degree curiosity (and sympathy) drove Western scholarship about the Islamic world.

The Art of Thinking


Gertrude Himmelfarb's lives of the mind

BY DAVID GELERNTER

This is a complex, challenging book by one of the world's smartest and deepest scholars at the top of her game. It's a series of essays on modern thinkers, mainly British, from Edmund Burke and Jane Austen to Michael Oakeshott and Lionel Trilling. (The essays have appeared before, but most have been substantially revised for this book.)

Gertrude Himmelfarb's list is wide ranging, but her messages are clear: Read meticulously and without prejudice and you can expect surprises—especially if you are a conventional liberal or a conventional academic who would rather think than act. (Pure thought is no good—is top-heavy and likely to capsize—without the ballast of everyday, practical experience.) A careful reader must not expect to see big pictures in the clouds. Truth is in the details, and is not necessarily dramatic. But if you stand back and look carefully, you just might catch a glimpse of the intellectual and spiritual battle that is being waged in the background of these essays. The title—*The*

David Gelernter is the author, most recently, of The Muse in the Machine: Computerizing the Poetry of Human Thought.



'The Awakening Conscience' (1853) by William Holman Hunt

Moral Imagination—hints at the nature of the battle.

Some of the pieces focus on a single work; most are miniature intellectual biographies that take in huge amounts of ground. In either case, Himmelfarb

The Moral Imagination

From Edmund Burke
to Lionel Trilling

by Gertrude Himmelfarb

Ivan R. Dee, 288 pp., \$26

resists the temptation that afflicts nine out of ten of the world's celebrity intellectuals: to write books that, no matter what the ostensible topic, are all about themselves. Himmelfarb richly deserves to be an egomaniac, but is not.

The single most important thing about *The Moral Imagination* is the challenge it poses to its readers. To make sense of this book, you must have your brain turned on every step of the way. Your first problem is to fig-

ure out what the title means. (Burke introduced the phrase "moral imagination.") The author isn't so much interested in novel or imaginative ethical systems as in thinkers who present moral realities in original ways.

"What other reformers tried to do with legislation," she writes of Charles Dickens, "he did by a supreme act of moral imagination"—he used fiction to plant the poor as individual men and women in the minds of a nation that all too readily blurred them together. Dickens dressed up moral reality in new togs and sent it forth into society to make its way. Jane Austen managed things differently in *Emma*, where "the moral lesson emerges slowly, tentatively, lightened with humor and irony." But Austen and Dickens both evinced "moral imagination" by confronting the public with moral problems in unexpected guises, against unexpected backdrops—which made old problems

Tate Gallery, London / Art Resources, NY

seem new. The same holds for most of the others on the list.

Two related Himmelfarb themes come together in her comment on Dickens (“What other reformers tried to do with legislation . . .”). First, truth is in the details; don’t skim along at an elevated philosophical altitude, with your nose in the air, or you will miss what’s important. Second, reasoning is no good unless it is grounded in practical reality. Himmelfarb is a scholar’s scholar, who admires thinking *and* doing. Listing Walter Bagehot’s many fields (banking, journalism, literature, politics), she concludes of the journalist and essayist that “it was his practical experience of these worlds, filtered through a subtle and sensitive mind, that gave him his remarkable intellectual power.” Likewise with the idiosyncratic conservative Michael Oakeshott, whose “admirers take delight in the fact that he was a racing man and the owner of a racing horse, and in his disdain for academic solemnities and proprieties.”

The next big challenge for alert readers is to figure out why Himmelfarb has chosen these particular subjects. Her introduction explains that she admires them; but what makes them admirable? Everyone on her list is an eminent author—although Benjamin Disraeli and Winston Churchill were even more eminent statesmen. Some are essayists, some are novelists. All deal with moral questions without being professionals in the field of ethics—although Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill *are* philosophers in good standing and did write about moral questions.

The truth might lurk in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous discussion of nouns like “game”—there *is* no one attribute that all “games” share. Instead they show a “family resemblance.” One bunch of games shares one property, another (which might partially overlap the first) shares some other property. The thinkers on Himmelfarb’s list are woven together by criss-crossing attributes, not by any one characteristic.

Again, Himmelfarb refuses to think for her readers. She makes observations about the past that are

blatantly relevant today—but since the relevance is blatant, the reader can figure out the connections himself. “Disraeli had not only to convince the country of its national interests; he had to convince his own Foreign Office and cabinet.” (President Bush has the same problem with the State Department and the CIA.) Something was bothering John Stuart Mill: “When almost every person who can spell, can and will write,” he wondered, “what is to be done?” The world will be flooded with ersatz wisdom! How will we tell the gems from the junk? How will we keep up with the sheer volume of new publication? The Internet age has made all his anxieties come true.

Repeatedly these essays reveal something surprising or at odds with conventional scholarship. The hero and heroine of a Jane Austen romance marry for love, but out of “moral urgency,” too. John Stuart Mill is, indeed, a great champion of liberal individualism, but there is an “other Mill” besides (and not his father!). Free of the daunting influence of his companion-then-wife Harriet Taylor, Mill was no longer opposed to authority, or religion, or even prayer. Michael Oakeshott’s career is a double surprise. You might have pictured this quiet, judicious, soft-spoken conservative as a friend of Christianity. In fact, he was lukewarm verging on hostile. But in his last major work, *On Human Conduct* (1975), he changed his mind and produced “a sensitive and moving account of religious faith.” Himmelfarb reminds us that a man’s thoughts change over a lifetime.

She reminds us, too, of how often the liberal mainstream neglects the conservative side of history. A serious student must reckon with the conservative tendencies of Austen, Mill, Trilling. Must cope with George Eliot’s refusal to sign a petition in favor of woman’s suffrage. Must understand Disraeli’s conservative beliefs—which cannot be dismissed as mere political poses—and must reckon with the fact that Disraeli as prime minister “could take credit for the most radical reform

of the century: a doubling of the electorate resulting in the enfranchisement of most of the urban working classes.”

The author’s consistency in letting readers figure things out for themselves makes *The Moral Imagination* an intellectual puzzle. Himmelfarb is a deep and sober author, but her book (maybe one shouldn’t admit it) is a game itself, challenging and illuminating. I found myself rushing back and forth from chapter to chapter, flipping pages in search of a phrase or idea I knew had occurred somewhere else. The more you invest in this book, the more it returns.

If it has a weakness, it lies in Himmelfarb’s occasional willingness to sacrifice breadth to depth. It’s intriguing that Dillwyn Knox, whose main intellectual passion was Greek poetry, should have been recruited by British naval intelligence to break German codes during World War II. But Himmelfarb gets into trouble when she calls Knox “largely responsible for breaking the German code known as Enigma.” Enigma wasn’t a code *per se*; it was an electromechanical coding machine. Which is unimportant. But how can the author ignore the epochal work on Enigma by the great mathematician Alan Turing? It’s too bad that Turing (being a scientific rather than literary type) is out of bounds.

Himmelfarb calls Thomas Hobbes “the most provocative of modern thinkers,” which is exactly the sort of daring intellectual swan dive into a cup of water that makes a book interesting. Readers *want* to know who was the most, the best, the greatest, the worst. Such judgments are almost always interesting, and it’s sad that today’s apathetic, cowardly intellectual establishment discourages them. But the inevitable questions arise: Was Hobbes really more provocative than Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx? Wittgenstein? Turing? Himmelfarb has written about the first three thinkers but not (so far as I know) about Wittgenstein (or Turing). Although Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher with a weakness for mathematics, he was

obsessed with moral questions as well.

But the weaknesses are minor, the strengths major. And if *The Moral Imagination* has an overarching theme, it has to do with the contrast between the “moral imagination” and the “liberal imagination” (the title of one of Trilling’s most important books). In the end, the moral and liberal imagination aren’t two independent topics; they are dead opposites. Their opposition has been building for two centuries, and is turning into full-fledged war.

Ultimately, it is religion that safeguards morality. And liberalism is, ultimately, the enemy of religion. These truths emerge from Trilling’s work. In many ways, Trilling was a champion of liberalism; yet he discerned in liberalism, as Himmelfarb notes, the seeds of paganism. And on the other hand, where “others found [T.S.] Eliot interesting in spite of his politics, Trilling found him interesting *because* of his politics: a politics not only conservative but religious, and not only religious but identifiably Christian.”

In the long run, liberalism intends to renounce Judeo-Christian morality in favor of a world in which human rights have replaced human duties; where only the state has obligations; and the passive, bovine citizenry can relax and let the state take care of everything. *The Moral Imagination* is the story of the ongoing struggle between the moral and the liberal imagination, between Judeo-Christian morality and liberalism. (In fairness, Himmelfarb doesn’t quite say all this; this is only my reading of her message.)

Here are the author’s bona fide, nonsense conclusions: If you care for the truth you must consider all the facts, evaluate every side, think and think again before you make a decision. If you follow this advice, you might find yourself drawing conservative conclusions again and again. As for the author herself, her luminous intellectual integrity is one of the most powerful weapons conservatism has ever possessed. ♦



Good Intentions

How Big Plans in foreign aid yield Little Results.

BY VANCE SERCHUK

Last January, representatives of more than fifty countries and nearly a dozen international organizations gathered in London for a conference on the future of Afghanistan. In addition to speeches by global leaders like Kofi Annan, and newspaper headlines about the billions of aid dollars pledged, the summit produced an ambitious, five-year plan for Afghanistan—a collective declaration that promises the disbandment of militias, sharp cuts in opium production, improvements in educational access for the disabled, and a 20 percent reduction in the number of chronically poor female-headed households, among many, many other goals.

Reading the Afghanistan Compact, it’s hard not to be taken in by its breadth of vision. As one of the poorest places on earth—ranked 173rd out of 177 countries in the U.N. Human Development Index, alongside the likes of Guinea-Bissau and Burundi—not to mention a frontline state in the war on terror, Afghanistan cries out for international assistance to tackle its countless problems. And what better way to help that unfortunate country than with a big, multilateral, Western-financed plan?

Not so fast, warns William Easterly, professor of economics at New York University and fellow at the Center for Global Development, who has produced a provocative, fascinating book, arguing that the single greatest mistake in foreign aid over the past five decades has been its obsession with “Big Plans”

that attempt to solve all of a poor country’s problems in one fell swoop.

Easterly is an intellectual in the tradition of Edmund Burke, Friedrich von Hayek, and Michael Oakeshott, respectful of the complexity of societies and profoundly skeptical of elaborate, top-down schemes to make them anew.

Government works well, he observes, when there is accountability, which in turn requires a clear and observable relationship between efforts and results. But

because poverty in any given developing country is a tangle of myriad political, economic, social, and historical factors, the link between what an individual aid agency is doing and its goal of spurring growth is intrinsically vague. In other words, by trying to take responsibility for everything, big plans end up ensuring that they are responsible for nothing.

In the absence of good metrics by which to grade themselves, aid agencies (like bureaucracies everywhere) tend to latch onto bad ones. Witness, for instance, the proliferation of glitzy, media-friendly summits and the emphasis on the volume of aid being spent rather than its real world impact. “Aid agencies,” Easterly writes, “skew their efforts toward visible outcomes, even when those outcomes have a lower payoff than less visible interventions.”

Big plans are also inimical to the bottom-up feedback that good governance depends on. Aid agencies, after all, answer to the governments of the developed countries that fund them, rather than the poor people they are intended to help. Thus, it should come as no surprise that “aid agencies are rewarded for setting goals rather than

The White Man’s Burden
Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good
by William Easterly
Penguin, 448 pp., \$27.95

Vance Serchuk is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

reaching them, since goals are observable to the rich-country public while results are not.”

But just because economic development depends on the “bottom-up emergence of complex institutions and social norms that are difficult for outsiders to understand, much less change,” that’s not to say Easterly is in favor of doing away with foreign aid. On the contrary, the challenge, he argues, is to shift its emphasis away from millenarian schemes and toward “modest interventions that make people’s lives better.” As *The White Man’s Burden* insists, the task is “not to abandon aid to the poor, but to make sure it reaches them.”

In practice, this means that development agencies should “focus on narrow, solvable problems” in areas where the relationship between inputs and outcomes is more straightforward, such as health, electrification, water, and piecemeal policy reforms. Easterly also offers a handful of provocative ideas geared toward improving accountability and feedback, such as an escrow account that would fund independent evaluations of aid projects, and development vouchers for communities of the extremely poor, which could be redeemed for services from NGOs and aid agencies. “The most important suggestion is to search for small improvements, then brutally scrutinize and test whether the poor got what they wanted and were better off, and then repeat the process.”

As much as is possible for a book describing gut-wrenching poverty and human misery, *The White Man’s Burden* is actually a very fun read. Books about the plight of Africa and development economics tend to be tedious affairs, weighed down by sanctimony and self-importance, not to mention plain bad writing. Thankfully, Easterly is as engaging and entertaining as he is cerebral, and his book crackles with combative, often cheeky, prose. He is keenly aware that outrage is better communicated by blistering wit than by angry tirades or glib moralizing.

He suggests, for example, that judg-

ing aid by the total amount of money given to poor countries is a little like telling moviegoers that *Catwoman* (voted worst film of 2004) wasn’t really so bad because, after all, it cost a whopping \$200 million to make. In the pathology of aid, he quips, “the rich people who pay for the tickets are not the ones who see the movie.”

That’s not to say there aren’t chinks in Easterly’s armor. According to *The White Man’s Burden*, the obsession with grandiose social engineering and big plans is a peculiar Western fixation, a



William Easterly

Penguin Press

reflection of “white arrogance.” But as Easterly well knows, political elites in developing countries have been equally willing to buy into the dream of a top-down, comprehensive transformation of their societies, especially in the aftermath of decolonization. Easterly acknowledges at several points the capacity of governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America for corruption and venality, but he fails to mention the extent to which leaders like Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah were just as easily seduced as Western intellectuals by myths like the “poverty trap” and the “Big Push.”

Nor were the World Bank and the Agency for International Development alone in peddling these dubious theories. As Easterly himself detailed in his previous book, *The Elusive Quest for*

Growth, early development economics was heavily influenced by the perceived success of Stalin’s crash industrialization program in the 1930s, and throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was aggressively pushing its economic ideology across the developing world. Although inconvenient for the purposes of Easterly’s title, utopian social engineering schemes have proven appeal across ethnic, racial, and cultural lines.

Easterly is also less convincing in his criticism of Western military intervention, which he singles out as the epitome “of what this book argues you should not do—have the West operate on other societies with virtually no feedback.”

On the one hand, Easterly deserves praise for acknowledging that foreign aid and military intervention are two sides of the same coin: Both are fundamentally about leveraging national power to affect the internal conditions of a foreign society. In addition, he’s right to point out the hypocrisy of liberals and conservatives alike in blindly embracing one approach and skeptically rejecting the other: “The Left likes the idea of a big-state led effort to fight global poverty. The Right likes the idea of benevolent imperialism to spread Western capitalism and subdue opposition to the West.”

But at times, Easterly paints with too broad a brush, especially in his assertion that “military interventionists are inherently Planners.” In fact, no. In villages in rural Afghanistan, American soldiers meet with local leaders, listen to their requests, and implement small-scale, quick-impact projects, such as digging wells, building schools, or providing medical care for basic ailments. In many respects, the U.S. military in Afghanistan is closer to Easterly’s vision of how foreign assistance should work than the aid bureaucrats in Kabul who complain that the soldiers’ modest projects haven’t been sufficiently pre-programmed into national development strategies.

It’s too bad Easterly didn’t apply his ideas about aid to military intervention: Namely, that there are limits to its ability

to transform a foreign society, but that it is also capable of accomplishing certain discrete and valuable objectives—if wielded wisely. The ouster of the Taliban could no more have been accomplished through foreign aid than the elimination of malaria can be carried out with F-18s. But both are decent, progressive objectives to be touted by anyone who cares about helping people in the developing world.

There are other quibbles, such as Easterly's disregard for the importance of U.S. military aid and security guarantees in development success stories like Taiwan, Turkey, South Korea, and postwar Japan, or his *diktat* against "bossing around" bad governments when diplomatic and economic pressure has, in many instances, played a helpful role in managing transitions from autocracy to democracy, from Chile to South Africa. But these are small indiscretions set against a much larger accomplishment: *The White Man's Burden* is a bold and valuable book that deserves to be read far beyond the development policy priesthood.

Indeed, as the American role in Afghanistan makes clear, the line between defense and development is fuzzier today than at any point since the height of the Cold War. Forty years ago, the central front for American security interests still lay in industrialized Europe and East Asia. Now the center of gravity has shifted decisively into the developing countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while the Bush administration has articulated a grand strategy explicitly predicated on their political and economic liberalization.

As policymakers contemplate how to pursue this U.S. interest, they would do well to read Easterly's work. You need not accept all of his arguments to realize that *The White Man's Burden* is one of the smartest books in a long time to consider both the potential, and the limitations, of outside intervention in the developing world. There are few more important questions in foreign policy today, and no better guide than William Easterly in exploring them. ♦



On Plato's Terms

The rule of the wise is just, but no picnic.

BY MARK BLITZ

What should we make of Plato's *Republic*? It is, on its face, an odd and even preposterous book, one that glorifies practices that should disturb any lover of individual freedom. Its government is based on lies more outrageous than those the slimiest—or best—of our politicians have the wit or courage to concoct. Its religious life is so dogmatically controlled that toleration is not even imagined, let alone dismissed. The arts are

limited more completely than the most narrowminded prig could dare to hope. The family is destroyed, private property eliminated, and (some) incest permitted. To move this scheme from the drawing board to the streets, moreover, everyone in the chosen venue who is over ten must be removed. No wonder that, a generation ago, many readers were hard pressed to see the difference between the *Republic* and the totalitarian regimes we were bound to destroy.

Despite these obvious political problems, however, most still treat it as a work that freely or "liberally" educated men and women should read. When journalists blather about saving Western Civilization, scholars build up and then bury themselves under the Great Books, and academics plot to establish mandatory Western Civilization courses, the *Republic* is always among the works on their minds. Few students at good colleges can avoid it.

How can we account for this split between what our political preferences

should reject and what our educational practices promote? How should we deal with this discrepancy?

One explanation is inertia and indifference. Despite our taste for novelty, we mostly do today what we did yesterday. We are in the habit of treating the *Republic* as a work we should read and of not taking seriously the political parts we despise.

The bright side of this inertia is to keep the *Republic* alive, so that it might occasionally stir someone. An indifferently observed antique may surprisingly attract us in its original beauty. The dark side is that the accumulated tarnish becomes so impenetrable that the original beauty is almost altogether lost. What did we see in the *Republic* in the first place? To understand this is to see the reasons beyond habit why we read it, and why we can accommodate its tension with liberal democracy.

The *Republic* is the founding work of political philosophy. It subjects phenomena such as law, justice, happiness, and virtue to unrelenting study. It questions the ways of life and modes of action and education that we almost always take for granted. It looks for the true and permanent merit behind our practices.

Such questioning makes political philosophy inherently liberalizing, for it frees our minds from the hard, rigid ways of unquestioned tradition, custom, religion, and law. This liberalizing, rather than indifference or academic habit, is the first major substantive explanation for the *Republic's* continued importance.

The second is its use in improving liberal democracy by presenting possi-

Plato's Republic
A Study
by Stanley Rosen
Yale, 432 pp., \$45

Mark Blitz, Fletcher Jones Professor of Political Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, is most recently the author of *Duty Bound: Responsibility and American Public Life*.



Plato and Aristotle in Raphael's 'School of Athens' (1509-13)

Corbis / Ted Spiegel

bilities that our way of life too easily overlooks. Liberalism leaves many important matters to private choice—marriage, profession, religion, much development of character and artistic culture. How should we exercise this choice? The *Republic* helps to guide us by inspiring us to the excellence of character and intellect whose substance is downplayed or occluded in our democracies.

The *Republic*'s utility for liberalism does not eradicate its radicalism. It usefully examines justice and virtue, but it remains politically illiberal. It frees us intellectually, but it tries to attract the most able to a life of endless seeking of truths that are beyond the concerns of ordinary patriotism and happiness.

Plato softens the rigor of his underlying radicalism in several ways. One is to emphasize the practical need for continued examination, lest we prove confused about our deepest goals. Another is to portray the radical split between philosophical exploration and ordinary action only with certain audiences at certain times. Elements of both approaches come through in many of his dialogues, as we see in the *Apology* and in the *Republic* itself. The effect is to dampen Plato's radicalism for most practical purposes.

This Platonic presentation would largely suffice for us today as well, if we did not face two additional problems. We believe discussions such as the *Republic*'s to be models for action, so the gap between our liberal democracy

and the *Republic*'s practices makes it especially hard not to condemn. And we think that philosophers' love of truth must be opposed to all lying, including all ameliorative rhetoric.

We can deal with the problem of rhetoric by overcoming our moralism and holding fast to the difference between loving truth and speaking it. We can deal with the problem of "utopianism" by suggesting that the *Republic* is not a blueprint for action but, rather, a means to examine the limits of justice. It develops extreme versions of practices in which all communities engage: the instability of these extremes shows that political life never can be simply just; the effect is to moderate our most fantastic political hopes and ambitions.

Each community must teach that something special unites its citizens, that its distribution of wealth and position is not random or unfair, that its rulers are able to see what is best, that some types of art and education should be promoted and others disdained, and that common effort must when necessary supplant individual satisfaction. The *Republic*'s stories about citizens' origin and class position, and its attempt to institute perfect breeding, common ownership, and rule by philosophers are extreme ways to meet these needs. The absurdity of these tales, however, the conflict between lives devoted to philosophic examination and to managing political trivia, and the inevitable division between

private desire and common good, all show that political life cannot perfectly embody wisdom, just distribution, and devotion to the common good.

Part of Plato's intention in the *Republic* is to make such political imperfection visible.

Stanley Rosen disputes this interpretation in *Plato's Republic: A Study*. He labels it "Straussian," while acknowledging his debt to Leo Strauss. Plato would not have elaborated the *Republic*'s institutions so fully or consorted with tyrants in Syracuse had he not believed them to be practically good and hoped to implement them. The source of political extremism is not citizens' desire for a perfect justice that proves unattainable politically, but philosophers' ambitions. Still, Rosen is too much a student of Strauss to believe that we can separate anything Plato writes from its dramatic context. He therefore often backtracks from the more extreme versions of his claim: The *Republic* is a "daydream" whose source is the philosopher's wish to be a tyrant, but it also recognizes both the danger of implementing this wish and the philosopher's contrary desire not to rule.

Rosen's point, finally, is that, although rule of the wise is just, it will not bring happiness.

Rosen's book is a long, detailed, thoughtful discussion of each section of the *Republic*. It makes arguments in every chapter that are worth pondering. Perhaps surprisingly, however, given Rosen's view of Plato's political purpose, he does not say much about the

Republic's political institutions that is not apparent in Strauss, Allan Bloom, and others. Rosen's most intriguing practical arguments concern Plato's failure to uncover the phenomenon of political prudence that is central in Aristotle. Rosen also questions the analogy between the city and the soul around which Plato organizes much of his discussion. Here, however, he does not credit sufficiently the difficulties with the comparison to which Plato himself points.

Rosen's strength is his discussion of Plato's famous "Ideas," and other philosophical subjects. He does not accept arguments that Plato is not serious about the Ideas' existence. He explores their basis in "the everyday act of discerning shapes, patterns, forms, or looks that allow us to distinguish one thing from another." He reminds contemporary thinkers who believe that everything is a matter of what comes into being and passes away that, ultimately, "the absence of formal structure leaves us with nothing to talk about and thus nothing to say."

Rosen illuminates Plato's Ideas by giving a searching and powerful discussion of the meaning of models, paradigms, and examples, for (among other things) Ideas are models. But Rosen so fully splits recognizing an Idea such as justice from judging which actions are just that he claims that knowing what justice is theoretically is useless politically. He arrives at this disjunction only by downplaying ways of connecting ideas and actions that split them less completely: originals and their images, wholes and their parts, aspiration and what satisfies it.

But why should recognizing what, say, courage is not help us to become more courageous, and act more courageously?

Rosen's overall argument leads him to a peculiar understanding of the *Republic's* view of the philosophic life. He claims that the *Republic* is philosophically tyrannical because its education of potential philosophers produces Platonists or Socratics. Rosen does not clarify why this is dogmatic, however. The openness and frequent inconclusiveness of Plato's dialogues suggest

otherwise, as does the fact that the Socratic search for wisdom is not identical with its achievement. Rosen recognizes this openness generally, but apparently thinks that the regime of the *Republic* is less forgiving. He chooses here to ignore Socrates' views in favor of what he himself believes that the rule of philosophers requires.

Moreover, although Rosen probes the connection between justice and happiness, he does not explore in depth Plato's view that the philosophic life is the happiest and most just. No other life can use our reason as fully, love as steadily what is as majestic, come as close to what is good, or overcome as courageously the usual ties that bind us. Rosen considers the *Republic* to be an advertisement for philosophy, but he presents his version of its outsized ambitions more forcefully than he does its actual allure. This neglect is connected to Rosen's excessive separation of the happy and the just soul, which in both cases is one where all our powers

excel. In this sense, philosophy is its own reward.

In Rosen's more extreme statements, he accuses the *Republic* of tyranny, but he does not tell us to ignore or shun it. He sees it correctly as a warning against the rule of pseudo-philosophers, and employs it as a caution against philosophy becoming ideology. In fact, the *Republic's* combination of inspiration to virtue and understanding of practical limits also shows one way that philosophy may be useful to us politically without degenerating to ideology. In this regard, I wish that Rosen had gathered and analyzed his several remarks about nature, for "nature," as philosophers understand it, forms a crucial link between Plato's thought and our own guiding principle of natural rights.

The reader will benefit from Rosen's highly intelligent and rigorous analyses of philosophical issues. But he can turn away safely from his more excessive practical claims. ♦



Pharmutopia

Antidepressants and the numbing-down of America.

BY SALLY SATEL

Pity John Green? His wife makes him miserable, but he wants to stay married for the sake of his young son. When Green's doctor starts him on the antidepressant Prozac, he finds himself less distraught and able to live "happily inside his loveless marriage."

As a psychiatrist, I think this might not be so bad: The father gets some peace of mind and the boy grows up in

an intact (albeit imperfect) family. But to Dr. Ronald Dworkin, who interviewed John Green for his new book, the man is a "victim" of drug-induced "artificial happiness"—a state of being, the author writes, in which "what [people] get from life doesn't penetrate them too deeply."

As a card-carrying member of the new Happy Class, John has seen his powers of introspection blunted by Prozac. And his fate, Dworkin gloomily predicts, is "to stagnate in a pool of sham happiness, and sacrifice any chance for the real thing." (Of course, if John went for the "real thing" for

Artificial Happiness

The Dark Side of the New Happy Class

by Ronald W. Dworkin
Carroll & Graf, 336 pp., \$24.95

Sally Satel is the co-author of One Nation Under Therapy: How the Helping Culture Is Eroding Self-Reliance.



Corbis / Najiah Feanny

himself, it might lead to a much more troubled life for his child.)

In *Artificial Happiness*, Dworkin sounds the alarm about societal damage created by “an entire class of people who stupefy themselves regularly and constantly . . . and live not on society’s fringes but its mainstream.” Unfortunately, his case relies heavily on sweeping generalizations, cherry-picked anecdotes, and heavy doses of judgmentalism about how people should live, and assumptions about what they feel.

A practicing anesthesiologist with a doctorate in political philosophy, Dworkin says there is an excess of hollow happiness in our culture. This abundance, he argues, is the product of three new movements: psychopharmacology, alternative medicine, and obsessive exercising. All of them flourished along with the decline of traditional “doctoring,” an era when family docs took time to talk to patients. Today’s primary care physicians embrace and promote these compensatory movements for the purpose of combating the “disease of unhappiness,” something their medical forebears did by just spending quality time listening and giving advice.

Unfortunately, says Dworkin, these remedies backfired, seducing patients into an “artificial happiness” that prevents them from taking stock of their lives and changing them for the better.

The Big Socratic Questions loom: How to live a good life? What is true happiness? Dworkin’s solution is “to live in accord with the demands of [one’s] conscience.” He may be right that if only some pill takers, acupuncture junkies, and exercise zealots had “sensible people to talk to,” or read about the world’s great philosophies, the unhappiness that is allegedly driving their misguided efforts at relief would melt away. It’s not so hard, he says; people can “change their situation with the slightest effort.”

Neurosis, anyone? What might look to an outsider like problems easily fixed with modest adjustments can seem insurmountable to the sufferer. Making changes often requires painful confrontation of emotional conflicts that many people (perhaps most) want to avoid like the plague. And of course, there are people like John Green, whose despair was a rational response to a difficult situation. Would it be better for Green to leave his wife in pursuit of authentic happiness,

whatever that is? Who are we to say?

Dworkin’s analysis of John Green at the beginning of his chapter on antidepressants prefigures the one-sided discussion that follows. Yes, there are some patients who report feeling muted on the drug, but keep taking it because (as in John Green’s case) the benefits outweigh the risks. Others suffer a loss of empathy, competence, or ambition—but these are just more reasons, as Dworkin notes, why primary care doctors should not prescribe psychiatric drugs: They rarely follow up, and so these effects go unmonitored.

In my experience, patients tend not to like that anesthetized sensation and frequently stop taking the drug anyway. More important, though, are the vast numbers of people on antidepressants who choose to stay on them because the drug’s stabilizing effect on mood gives them the sense of control needed to expand their outlook or improve their circumstances. We hear nothing of them from Dworkin. Although data are difficult to come by, it seems implausible that millions of people continue to take a drug that really makes them paralyzed.

Nonetheless, the author frets about

the “implications for society when millions of people fight their unhappiness with external cures.” While no responsible person claims that the rapid expansion of psychopharmacology and alternative medicine has been without problems, the book gives us scant evidence that they are further corrupting the nation’s psyche and character.

Dworkin is much stronger when he takes to task primary care doctors for improper medical care, such as prescribing medication without properly diagnosing a psychiatric condition, or prescribing alternative therapies that have not been proven effective. He is right to criticize lax standards and suggests some worthy remedies. Yet blanket speculations pop up as fact: “Primary care doctors stopped being idealists; for them, antidepressants became a source of power,” “Both doctors and patients want the deceit and need the deceit perpetuated by the psychotropic drug ideology,” and “[people] remain at

the stage of life where they found Artificial Happiness.”

Questions abound. Are alternative medicine and exercises “prescribed” primarily to treat unhappiness? Are physicians really the major engine behind their popularity? Dworkin’s formulations are too pat to be persuasive. Furthermore, was there so much more *genuine* happiness before the arrival of these new movements? After all, “artificiality” is as old as humankind—if to be artificial means not wanting to make hard life changes, or engage in probing psychic inventories.

Artificial Happiness: The Dark Side of the New Happy Class is a provocative and well-written book with many edifying excursions into medical history, sociology, and religion. Yet every dark side implies an upside. And that aspect is virtually unacknowledged by Dworkin, leaving this reader to think that she got only half the story. *Artificial Happiness* starts with a shaky premise and ends with an unsatisfying conclusion. ♦

bank into the woods. But then the Swiss banker tries to steal the attaché case. Fortunately, they bonk him on the head, steal his armored truck, and end up in a villa with a very rich English guy on crutches who tells them that Jesus married Mary Magdalene and had a kid and the Roman Catholic Church knows it and has been covering it up for nearly two millennia.

Just then the albino shows up to kill all of them. But the girl cop gives the albino a clonk and he’s out on the floor, which seems very convenient, considering that he’s the world’s most dangerous and efficient assassin. More French cops show up, but the rich English guy has already stashed the professor, the cute cop, and the albino on a plane to London. Then it turns out that the albino is secretly working for the English guy, even though the albino doesn’t know it because he thinks he’s working for Opus Dei. The professor tricks the English guy by seeming to destroy the key piece of evidence in the Jesus-Mary cover-up. But then it turns out that he didn’t destroy it at all, and wouldn’t you know it, the cute French cop turns out to be Jesus’s great-great-great-etc. grandchild! And she’s just like anybody’s grandchild, because not once has she gone to visit Him.

Then the professor figures out that Mary Magdalene’s tomb is in the basement of the Louvre. Oh, and the professor is afraid of enclosed spaces because he fell down a well once when he was a boy. The end.

The movie is faithful to Dan Brown’s hugely successful novel in every way except for the one that matters. It may be true that Brown used the conspiracy-thriller form as a vehicle to try to rewrite all of Christian history, as some distressed columnists have suggested over the past few weeks as the movie’s opening weighed heavily on their minds. But it seems hard to believe this journeyman novelist actually thought anyone would take his cock-and-bull story seriously, especially since his chosen vehicle for revolutionary reformation is an adult version of one of those *Encyclopedia*



Opus Dei Did It

An earnest version of a playful bestseller.

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

If you would like to save two-and-a-half hours of your life, read the next four paragraphs and you will be able to avoid the endlessly turgid film version of *The Da Vinci Code* while still being able to converse knowledgeably about it at outdoor barbecues and formal functions.

So there’s this guy being chased by an albino through the Louvre at night. After he gets shot by the albino, who is a monk in his spare time,

John Podhoretz, a columnist for the New York Post, is the WEEKLY STANDARD’s movie critic and author of Can She Be Stopped?

the guy lays himself out, spread-eagled, on the floor and writes something in invisible ink on that same floor about a professor of “religious symbolism” at Harvard. The French police summon the professor, who happens to be in Paris for a book tour because you know Harvard professors of religious symbolism often make a stop in Paris on their book tours.

A cute French cop figures out that the professor is getting set up, and, after a brief visit to the *Mona Lisa*, helps him hightail it out of the Louvre into a Swiss bank, where they get an attaché case and free ride out of the

The Da Vinci Code

Directed by Ron Howard





Columbia Pictures / Simon Mein

Audrey Tautou and Tom Hanks as 'professor of religious symbology.'

Brown stories for preteen boys. In those books, the title character solves an unsolvable mystery on the basis of almost no information, at which point the narrator asks readers: *How did Encyclopedia Brown know?* When the book sorts through the logical way Encyclopedia Brown figured out the mystery, it *still* seems impossible a little boy, an adult, or even Sherlock Holmes, could have figured it out.

Brown's *Da Vinci Code* has been so astoundingly popular because it's really a series of interlocking puzzles in prose—a Sudoku game in the form of a novel. It's laden with riddles, anagrams, and clues hidden inside Leonardo's paintings. There's even a 15th-century combination lock that contains a map. There's no way on earth that these bits of information could all come together so neatly in

just 24 hours to blow the lid off the Catholic Church, particularly considering how much of it is in code. *The Da Vinci Code* is a very playful book, which is what people love about it. And the spirit of play is exactly what is missing from Ron Howard's movie.

Howard is one of the few really good American movie directors now working, but despite his long career in situation comedy, he doesn't have much of a sense of humor left. He seems to have taken *The Da Vinci Code* seriously as a shocking exposé of the "greatest cover-up in human history." So instead of making a crackling thriller that would allow his leading actor Tom Hanks to show off his mischievous way with a one-liner, he has collaborated with screenwriter Akiva Goldsman on a mystery pockmarked and mottled by absurd coincidences that seem all the

more glaring because the tone here is so ridiculously solemn.

Still, the movie's box-office bonanza its first weekend wasn't solely due to the book's popularity. For good or ill, *The Da Vinci Code* is the first high-budget, big-star murder mystery to be released in years. Once a staple of the cinema, the murder mystery has vanished from the big screen and taken up permanent residence on television in venues as various as the ghoulish *CSI* and the witty *Monk*. With Tom Hanks as a detective, and the great old ham Ian McKellen as his sidekick, even a dud like *The Da Vinci Code* is going to continue to draw audiences with no interest in comic book heroes or animated squirrels raiding supermarkets.

The Da Vinci Code isn't much, but moviegoing beggars can't be choosers. ♦

The Standard Reader



"I stand corrected—it's feed a cold, starve a fever."

Books in Brief



***Traitor's Kiss* by Gerald Seymour** (Overlook, 428 pp., \$24.95). In life and on the page, espionage has changed. When Captain

Viktor Archenko, chief of staff to the commander of Russia's Baltic Fleet and a spy for British intelligence, is threatened with exposure, the question is not how the compromised agent will be rescued (ex-filtrated in spy speak) but whether an attempt will even be made in a time of cynical and pragmatic statecraft. To computer-savvy new-school spy Gabriel Locke, Archenko is a traitor, a relic of an earlier era, and utterly expendable. But Rupert Mowbray, recently retired Cold Warrior and self-proclaimed "old fart," appeals to his superiors' sense of loyalty, insisting that effecting a rescue is the only honorable course. Mowbray's assistant Alice North formed a romantic and sexual relationship with Archenko, the one great love of her life. While it's clear where the reader's sympathy will lie, nothing is as simple as it seems when the highly risky rescue plan is put into action.

The overall tone of the book is

pessimistic, and carnage is high among the large cast of characters, though some achieve at least a provisionally happy ending. A reluctance to accept responsibility afflicts the upper echelons of British espionage, while a Polish proverb explains the self-serving activities of some of the other characters: "The devil dances in an empty pocket."

Seymour, formerly a British television reporter, has been producing intelligent political and espionage fiction since *Harry's Game*. While he provides enough action, danger, and hardware to satisfy the bread-and-butter thriller buff, his complex and conflicted characters commend him to readers of masters like Eric Ambler, John Le Carré, and Graham Greene. His political message never overwhelms the human story, but Seymour clearly believes Russia's threat to the West did not end with the fall of the Soviet Union.

—Jon L. Breen



***Why Gender Matters: What Parents and Teachers Need to Know about the Emerging Science of Sex Differences* by**

Leonard Sax (Doubleday, 320 pp., \$24.95). For the past few decades, progressive parents have valiantly tried—and certainly have been urged to try—to raise their children in more gender-neutral ways. The goal of Leonard Sax's book, recently released in paperback, is to prove that such gender-blind parenting is not only a futile pursuit, but also a damaging one.

To do so, Sax relates in an engaging and accessible manner the recent scientific evidence for innate sex differences. Take sight. Given the option to look at either a dangling mobile or a smiling face, infants on the day they are born already show a large disparity in preference: Baby boys are more than twice as likely as baby girls to look at a mobile rather than a human face. Sax argues that these hardwired preferences may go some distance in explaining why boys are more interested in objects that move, like trucks and balls, and girls are more adept at identifying facial expressions: They simply see them better.

The most important point of the book—indeed, its *raison d'être*—is to convey the message that "sex differences in childhood are larger and more important than sex differences in adulthood." Even in areas where males and females eventually reach parity, such as reading and writing, the rate at which they develop these skills as children varies tremendously by gender. Clearly, educational strategies that recognize, respect, and take advantage of these differences—rather than unnaturally suppress them—will be more successful. The gender-neutral education that predominates today defeats that purpose by turning a blind eye to nature. Parents and teachers bucking this androgynous education trend will be gratified to have at their disposal an arsenal of objective, scientific data of just the type Sax provides.

—Susan Hamilton

suppose, though I'd like to see independent confirmation by the U.N. But

the couple's marital estate. Clearly in federal custody," Mr. Brolin that would rev

Parody

METROPOLITAN DIARY

DEAR Diary:
Strolling down East 46th Street with my five-year-old nephew, visiting Manhattan from his home in Kansas, we stop and join a small crowd gazing at the window display in the Gotham Book Mart. Suddenly my nephew points to a biography of Hitler, with a particularly chilling portrait of the Fuehrer on the dust jacket, and shouts, "Look, Aunt Nellie! There's President Bush!" As the crowd breaks out in appreciative applause, I think to myself, "Justin, you're not in Kansas anymore!"

Nellie G. Forbush

Dear Diary:

Scene: A crosstown bus late on a Monday afternoon, full of weary commuters packed tightly in the aisle.

In the midst of the throng is a sad-eyed, harried young mother, wrapped in a blue Nike warm-up jacket, her strawberry-blonde hair pulled back in a sensible bun. She dandles a young toddler on her knee, who cries persistently and seems impervious to her whispered words of comfort.

Finally, a young man, evidently of Middle Eastern origin, with a pencil moustache and sporting a blue wind-breaker, picks up the child and, with a seamless flourish, tosses him out an open window onto the sidewalk.

As the bleeding child recedes quickly from view, the sudden, blissful silence is broken only by the appreciative applause of riders, and a sigh of relief from the now-smiling mom.

Lucia Weisenheimer

Dear Diary:

I am a lifelong Yankees fan who also thinks the Mets are great, too! And when I'm not rooting for the Knicks, I'm screaming my lungs out for the Rangers! I can't decide which of the five boroughs is my absolute favorite, and Upstate New York is a summer visitor's paradise! Am I a typical New Yorker, or what?

H.R. Clinton

Dear Diary:

Every year at this time my wife and I travel from our home in rural New Jersey and stand for a few minutes on the platform at the 86th Street station in honor of our son, Mike, who was stabbed there by a homeless man in 1994. (He's fine now; some tourists were kind enough to call 9-1-1.) Over the years we've come to appreciate the "wonderful town" that Mike loves so much, and have even learned to savor the crowds and the noise, the sights and smells, of that busy subway platform.

This year, as we were standing there thinking about how close we came to losing Mike, an older woman, very elegantly dressed in a gray designer suit and black feathered hat, approached us with a quizzical look

on her face and, in what we used to call a Fifth Avenue accent, asked if we were waiting for the train. When we told her about our sad anniversary trips, she smiled and, touching my wife gently on the arm, exclaimed: "Then get the hell away from the damn map!" Everyone on the platform applauded appreciatively as we quickly stepped to one side.

Ruben Maloney

Dear Diary:

Growing up in Oklahoma during the 1950s, we were always told that New Yorkers are rude, boastful, and contemptuous of people from other places. Now, after 36 years in Manhattan, when I have to visit my inbred, relatives back "home," I tell them in no uncertain terms that

they're a thickhead even the world like travel, sp while I h without c and my l better an idiots.

Dear Diary:

Having 1940s, v me to E Christm their h show e Fifth A at Giml it off w the Aut

I was weeks a dren, Gugge exhibit ings of Hirsch in the caricat should with a Hart ninetic ever d my m of th Ziegl Gard dance

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Dear

Ev year Zim

